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Lisa Moss and Robert Plott in well written exam answers on how the § 704(b) regu-
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I. INTRODUCTION
Mirroring the trend nationwide, the popularity of limited
liability companies ("LLC"s) and limited liability partnerships
("LLP's) has grown rapidly in Alabama since the Alabama legis-
lature enacted its first LLC statute in 19931 and its first LLP
statute in 1996.2 LLCs and LLPs offer all members and part-
ners the same limited liability protection enjoyed by sharehold-
ers of corporations.3 Although LLCs, LLPs and corporations,
especially closely held corporations, often bear a strong resem-
blance to one another under state law, the federal income tax
system taxes these business organizations in radically different
ways based on whether the participants have filed articles of
1. ALA. CODE §§ 10-12-1 to -61 (1993), amended by Pub. L. No. 97-920, 1997
Ala. Acts 312, 1st Sp. Sess., No. 97-920, H. 3. The Alabama LLC Act became effec-
tive on October 1, 1993, and its amendments became effective on January 1, 1998.
ALA. CODE §§ 10-8A-101 to -1109 (1996); see also Susan Pace Hamill, The Origins
Behind the Limited Liability Company, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1461, 1463-69, nn.23, 36,
43, 59, 72, 73, 74, & 75 (1998) (documenting the movement of LLC statutes across
the states and the inside story behind the rise of the LLC).
2. In 1996, the state legislature repealed the "Alabama Partnership Act" (mod-
eled on the Uniform Partnership Act ("UPA") promulgated in 1914) and adopted the
Alabania Uniform Partnership Act ("RUPA"). RUPA supplements Alabama's partner-
ship law with provisions providing for a LLP. RUPA became effective January 1,
1997. See also Stover & Hamill, supra note *, at 816 n.11 (documenting the move-
ment of LLP statutes across the states starting with Texas in 1991).
3. ALA. CODE § 10-12-20(a) (1999).
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a member of a limited liability
company is not liable under a judgment, decree, or order of a court, or in any
other manner, for a debt, obligation, or liability of the limited liability compa-
ny, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise, or for the acts or omissions
of any other member, manager, agent, or employee of the limited liability
company.
Id.; ALA. CODE § 10-8A-306(c) (1999).
Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section and subsection (a) of Sec-
tion 10-8A-1010, a partner in a registered limited liability partnership is not
personally liable or accountable, directly or indirectly (including by way of
indemnification, contribution, assessment or- otherwise), for debts, obligations
and liabilities of, or chargeable to, the registered limited liability partnership
or another partner or partners, whether arising in tort, contract or otherwise,
solely by reason of being such a partner or acting (or omitting to act) in such
capacity, which such debts, obligations and liabilities occur, are incurred or are
assumed while the partnership is a registered limited liability partnership.
Id. § 10-8A-306(c).
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incorporation under state law. Regardless of the entity's busi-
ness characteristics, the Internal Revenue Code taxes all state
law corporations as corporations per se, which results in either a
two-tier tax under subchapter C or one level of taxation under
the restrictions imposed by subchapter S.4 On the other hand,
the Code automatically taxes LLCs and LLPs as partnerships
due to their unincorporated status under state law.5 The mem-
4. See I.R.C. § 7701(aX2), (3) (1994) (referring to the state law designations in
the definitions of corporation and partnership, with a requirement that a partnership
be engaged in business activity and the possibility of a partnership being treated as
an association taxable as a corporation); Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,127 (May 18, 1977),
Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,953 (May 14, 1979) (citing Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17
U.S. 518 (1819) and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 79-21-084 (Feb. 27, 1979) (the definition of corpo-
ration in § 7701(aX3) requires that all business organizations organized as corpora-
tions under state law be taxed as corporations for federal income tax purposes)). See
also Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Catalyst Exposing the
Corporate Integration Question, 95 MICH. L. REV. 393 (1996) (discussing the advan-
tages enjoyed by LLCs under the partnership tax regime as compared to the taxa-
tion of C and S corporations and examining the important question whether LLCs
(and due to same limited liability protection offered with partnership tax status,
LLPs) indirectly threaten the two-tier tax imposed on C corporations; the article
concludes that while LLCs will not materially undermine corporate tax revenues,
their widespread growth illustrates the inconsistent and unfair system of taxing
business organizations faced by small businesses and further exposes the complexi-
ties of the corporate integration issue in the context of larger businesses).
5. Section 7701 of the Code defines all unincorporated business organizations
as partnerships unless they are otherwise deemed associations or meet the definition
of a publicly traded partnership under § 7704. I.R.C. 88 7701(aX2), 7704 (Law. Co-
op. 1999). The current partnership classification regulations, often referred to as the
check-the-box regulations, tax all domestic unincorporated business organizations as
partnerships unless the participants affirmatively elect association status. See Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-1 to -4 (as amended in 1997). The 1960 partnership classification
regulations preceding the check-the-box regulations required all business entities pos-
sessing three out of four corporate characteristics (limited liability, continuity of life,
centralized management and free transferability of interests) to be taxed as a corpo-
ration. Unincorporated business entities that lacked at least two of these characteris-
tics would receive pass-through treatment under the partnership tax provisions.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (as amended in 1993 and repealed in 1996). The default
provisions of the Alabama LLC Act, passed in 1993, ensured that Alabama LLCs
complied with the 1960 classification regulations. See Rev. Rul. 94-6, 1994-1 C.B. 314
(holding that Alabama's LLC statutory default provisions confer partnership treat-
ment); see also Hamill, Origins, supra note 1, at 1504-08 (discussing the historical
trail of partnership classification regulations from 1913 until the Service promulgated
the 1960 regulations); Susan Pace Hamill, The Taxation of Domestic Limited Liabili-
ty Companies and Limited Partnerships: A Case for Eliminating the Partnership
Classification Regulations, 73 WAsH. U.L.Q. 565, 573-77, 581-98 (1995) (discussing
the development of the 1960 regulations leading up to the check-the-box regulations).
For Alabama state income tax purposes, LLCs follow the partnership classifi-
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bers or partners may affirmatively elect for the LLC or LLP to
be taxed as a corporation.6
The partnership tax provisions found in Subchapter K of the
Internal Revenue Code treat LLCs and LLPs as well as all other
unincorporated business organizations, referred to generically as
partnerships, as conduits with no income tax consequences. The
members of a LLC and the partners of a LLP, as well as all
other owners of unincorporated business organizations, referred
to generically as the partners, individually report their distribu-
tive shares of the partnership's items of taxable income, gain,
loss, deduction and credit, and these items retain the same char-
acter to the partners as determined at the partnership level.7
The Code affords important opportunities to partnerships that it
denies to S corporations. These include great contractual flexibil-
ity to allocate the distributive shares in any manner provided for
in the partnership agreement and the ability to receive distribu-
tive shares of partnership losses supported by shares of the
partnership's liabilities.8
In the earliest years, the partnership tax provisions, which
in their skeletal form date back to the first modern income tax
of 1913, implicitly assumed that the partners' distributive shares
of income and loss would follow their economic rights and obliga-
tions, thus fostering flexible economic arrangements.9 By the
late 1960s, however, the tendency to use the partnership form in
order to deflect distributive shares of losses and income to part-
ners without any corresponding economic consequences began to
proliferate rapidly out of control. 0 The Service's promulgation
cation provided by federal law:
For purposes of the taxing statutes in Title 40, Code of Alabama 1975, all
LLCs which, pursuant to Act 97-920, includes both single member and multi-
ple member LLCs, organized on or after January 1, 1997, will be classified as
they are classified for federal income tax purposes under the Internal Revenue
Service's "check-the-box" regulations.
ALA. REV. PRoc. 98-001 (1997).
6. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (as amended 1998).
7. I.R.C. §§ 701-702 (1994).
8. Id. §§ 704(b), 752 (1994).
9. See infra notes 17-24 and accompanying text (exploring the historical story
behind the partnership tax rules leading up to the 1954 Code).
10. See Hamill, Partnership Classification, supra note 5, at 574-75 (discussing
the use of tax shelters organized as limited partnerships proliferating out of control
and the failure of the partnership classification regulations then in effect to curb
[Vol. 51:2:603606
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of an elaborate set of regulations, known as the § 704(b) regula-
tions, represents one of many responses aimed at stopping allo-
cations of distributive shares carrying no economic consequenc-
es." Although the Service now possesses new weapons, the pas-
sive activity loss provisions enacted as part of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 being the most important, 2 to deny partners the
this spread); Hamill, Origins, supra note 1, at 1512-17 (tracing the birth of tax shel-
ter investments conducted in limited partnerships to the rise of independent oil
producers using limited partnerships, which for complex reasons related to the devel-
opment of the oil industry started to materially grow in the late 1960s); Hamill,
Corp'rate Integration, supra note 4, at 426-27 (discussing the use of limited part-
nerships and documenting the global net deficit shown by the aggregate of all limit-
ed partnerships nationwide through the 1980s which shows that limited partnerships
primarily produced distributive shares of tax losses).
By 1986 the tax shelter problem had become so widespread that Congress was
forced to respond with the passive activity loss rules. See infra note 12. The staff of
the Joint Committee on Taxation explained that Congress created those rules be-
cause the extensive tax shelter
activity contributed to public concerns that the tax system was unfair, and to
the belief that tax is paid only by the naive and the unsophisticated. This, in
turn, not only undermined compliance, but encouraged further expansion of
the tax shelter market, in many cases diverting investment capital from pro-
ductive activities to those principally or exclusively serving tax avoidance
goals.
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXN, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
TAX REFORM AcT OF 1986 210 (Joint Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter 1986 BLUE-
BOOK].
11. See infra notes 50-64 and accompanying text (detailing the historical trail of
the § 704(b) regulations promulgated after the statutory amendment of § 704(b) in
1976 and during the first waive of the tax shelter movement).
12. The passive activity loss provisions enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 are the most important of the anti-abuse provisions aimed at stopping tax
shelters. Essentially, the passive activity loss rules of § 469 force taxpayers to net
passive activity losses and credits against passive activity income. See I.R.C. § 469
(Law. Co-op. 1999). If the result is a net passive activity loss, the loss is suspended
and carried forward to the next year. See id. The staff of the Joint Committee on
Taxation explained that when the losses from passive* activities exceed the income
from passive activities, the "losses . . . generally cannot be applied to shelter other
income, such as compensation for services or portfolio income (including interest,
dividends, royalties, annuities, and gains from the sale of property held for invest-
ment)." 1986 BLUEBOOK, supra note 10, at 215; see also 1 WILLIAM S. MCKEE ET
AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS 10.08 (3d ed. 1997) (dis-
cussing the interaction of the passive activity loss rules with the partnership regula-
tions). The rules prevent the tax shelter abuses of the 1970s and 1980s where paper
losses-losses supported by partnership liabilities carrying little or no practical eco-
nomic risk of the partners' being required to make contributions to cover payment of
the liability-from passive activities were used to offset large amounts of other in-
come. See supra note 10 for an explanation of Congress' concerns with tax shelters.
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ability to avoid taxes inappropriately through partnership dis-
tributive shares,13 all unincorporated business organizations
taxed as partnerships still must comply with the § 704(b) regu-
lations in order to ensure that the partners' allocations of the
distributive shares will be respected. 14 As a result, general
practitioners advising LLCs and LLPs must have a working
knowledge of the § 704(b) regulations in order to adequately
serve their clients, even if the participants are not engaging in
any sophisticated tax planning.
This Article attempts to bring the mysterious web of com-
plexity surrounding the § 704(b) regulations, and the closely
related rules for sharing liabilities in the § 752 regulations,
closer to the average professional assisting LLCs and LLPs and
explores issues that arise under the § 704(b) regulations due to
the limited liability protection offered to all members of LLCs
and partners of LLPs.1' To understand the broader framework
from which these regulations arose, Part II presents a historical
13. The most recent curb within the partnership tax regulations is the anti-
abuse rule of § 1.701-2. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2 (as amended in 1995). Outside of the
partnership rules, the Service can invoke the protections of the at-risk rules of § 465
and the passive activity loss rules of § 469. See I.R.C. §§ 465 (1994), 469 (Law. Co-
op. 1999). For a more detailed discussion of these rules and their application to the
allocations of distributive shares, see 1 WILLIAM S. MCKEE ET AL., supra note 12,
9 10.04-10.08.
14. While the regulations were drafted for the purpose of preventing tax abuse,
they must be complied with even if the entity is not engaged in tax arbitrage.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(bXlXi) (as amended in 1997).
15. In many ways this Article represents a continuation of an earlier article,
published in the summer of 1992 a few months after the Service finalized the por-
tion of the § 704(b) regulations addressing allocations attributable to nonrecourse
liabilities and the § 752 regulations. Although the 1992 article explores the interplay
between the § 704(b) and the § 752 regulations and highlights issues within the
nonrecourse allocation rules, it does not focus on the unique issues raised by LLCs
and LLPs. See Susan Pace Hamill, Final Regulations Concerning Liabilities Join
Substantial Economic Effect Rules, 9 J. PARTNERSHIP TAX'N 99 (1992). The 1992
article does discuss the allocation rules and the rules for increasing outside basis for
shares of partnership liabilities in the context of book/tax disparities. A book/tax
disparity exists if one or more partnership properties is reflected on the
partnerships's books at a value that differs from the adjusted basis for tax purposes.
A book/tax disparity is typically created by contributions of property to the partner-
ship or when existing partnership property has been properly revalued. This Article
does not attempt to discuss the allocation rules and the rules for increasing outside
basis for shares of partnership liabilities in the context of book/tax disparities. See
id. at 126-29; I.R.C. § 704(c); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.704-1(bX2XivXf), (g) and 1.704-3 for
the allocation rules dealing with book/tax disparities.
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overview of partnership tax law, emphasizing the statutory and
regulatory evolution of § 704(b) and'§ 752. Part III explains the
mechanical rules of the § 704(b) regulations governing the
partners' distributive shares of taxable income and loss.
Part III first focuses on distributive shares that carry a real
possibility that the partners will enjoy economic benefits or
suffer economic burdens, known as allocations with substantial
economic effect, and then examines distributive shares, known
as nonrecourse deductions and minimum gain, that carry no
possibility of economic burdens or benefits. Part III also illus-
trates how the § 752 regulations apportion the increase to each
partner's basis in the partnership interest, known as outside
basis, in a manner reflecting the partners' distributive shares of
losses meeting the safe harbors provided by the substantial
economic effect and nonrecourse allocation portions of the
§ 704(b) regulations. Finally, Part III outlines the mechanical
details of and the need for a third set of rules governing alloca-
tions attributable to partner nonrecourse liabilities. These rules,
which parallel the nonrecourse allocation rules, apply if the
partnership as the borrower incurs nonrecourse debt under state
law under circumstances where a partner nevertheless bears the
economic risk of loss for the liability."6 This third regime gov-
erning distributive shares of losses and income attributable to
partner nonrecourse debt, while adding enormous complexity to
the § 704(b) regulations, ensures that the partners allocate the
proper amount of losses to the appropriate partner.
Part IV discusses how the three separate sets of rules for
allocating distributive shares of partnership income and losses
apply based on whether the participants choose to operate as a
general partnership, a limited partnership, a LLC or a LLP. If
the distributive shares of income result from the unincorporated
business organization earning true economic profit or if the dis-
16. The most common examples of partner nonrecourse debt include a partner
making a nonrecourse loan to the partnership and a partner guaranteeing a partner-
ship nonrecourse liability. See infra note 191 and Hamill, Final Regulations, supra
note 15, at 119. In each of these examples, the partnership as the borrower faces no
personal liability for payment of the debt (i.e., the creditor may only proceed against
those partnership assets contractually identified as collateral). However, the fact of
the partner making the loan or executing an independent guarantee causes the part-
ner to bear personal liability even though the partnership does not bear personal
liability. See infra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
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tributive shares of losses or income fall under the rules for allo-
cations attributable to nonrecourse or partner nonrecourse debt,
the allocation rules apply in the same manner regardless of the
business organization chosen because the existence of limited
liability protection does not affect the analysis. However, if the
presence or absence of limited liability protection affects the
potential economic burdens of some or all of the participants, the
type of business organization chosen materially affects the anal-
ysis of the distributive shares. If the business organization in-
curs recourse liabilities, meaning under state law the entity as
the borrower incurs personal liability, state law automatically
holds the general partners, of general and limited partnerships,
personally liable while the limited liability provided by LLCs
and LLPs protects all their members and partners from bearing
personal liability for these liabilities in the event the LLC or
LLP fails to pay. The automatic personal liability borne by gen-
eral partners activates the substantial economic effect rules for
distributive shares of losses and income attributable to recourse
debt incurred by general or limited partnerships while the state
law limited liability protection offered by LLCs and LLPs causes
the nonrecourse debt allocation rules to apply even if LLCs or
LLPs incur recourse liabilities.
Finally, Part IV explores the unique nuances that material-
ize when LLCs and LLPs incur recourse liabilities and raises the
fundamental question whether the § 704(b) regulations can be
altered in a manner that fosters proper allocations of distribu-
tive shares without the rules for allocations attributable to part-
ner nonrecourse liabilities. The limited liability protection pro-
vided to all members of LLCs and all partners of LLPs leads to
different portions of the § 704(b) regulations applying in circum-
stances with a strong substantive resemblance. Because of the
limited liability protection provided by LLCs and LLPs, the
members' or partners' economic risk of loss must come external-
ly from affirmative contractual agreements regardless of wheth-
er the LLC or LLP as the borrower incurs recourse or nonre-
course debt. If a member or partner bears the economic risk of
loss for the LLC's or LLP's recourse liabilities, the substantial
economic effect rules apply. However, if a member or partner
bears the economic risk of loss for the LLC's or LLP's nonre-
course liabilities, the partner nonrecourse debt rules apply.
[Vol. 51:2:603610
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Moreover, when LLCs and LLPs incur recourse liabilities, the
substantial economic effect rules create an opportunity for the
members or partners to allocate distributive shares of losses
away from the members or partners who actually bear the eco-
nomic burden by relying on an obligation to restore a deficit
capital account that in fact will never materialize and therefore
is illusory. Part IV concludes by exploring the possibility of mak-
ing amendments to the § 704(b) regulations that eliminate the
need to include the partner nonrecourse debt rules.
II. THE HISTORY BEHIND THE PARTNERSHIP TAx
ALLOCATION RULES
A Federal Income Tax Law Applicable to
Partnerships From 1913 Through the 1954 Code
The federal income tax law never imposed an entity level
tax on partnerships. The first corporate income tax, the Tariff
Act of 1909,"7 only covered corporations, joint stock companies,
associations, and insurance companies. 8 The first modern in-
come tax, enacted shortly after Congress ratified the Sixteenth
Amendment in 1913,"9 imposed the tax on both individuals and
corporations but included language exempting partnerships.0
17. Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11.
18. Id. The first corporate income tax provided as follows:
That every corporation, joint stock company or association, organized for
profit and having a capital stock represented by shares, and every insurance
company, now or hereafter organized under the laws of the United States or
of any State or Territory of the United State or under the Acts of Congress
applicable to Alaska or the District of Columbia or now or hereafter organized
under the laws of any foreign country and engaged in business in any State
or Territory of the United States or in Alaska or in the District of Columbia,
shall be subject to pay annually a special excise tax with respect to the car-
rying on or doing business by such corporation, joint stock company or associa-
tion, or insurance company, equivalent to one per centum upon the entire net
income over and above five thousand dollars received by it from all sources
during such [taxable] year....
Id.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (creating broad Congressional powers to tax).
20. Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(GXa), 38 Stat. 114.
T]he normal tax hereinbefore imposed upon individuals likewise shall be lev-
ied, assessed, and paid annually upon the entire net income arising or accru-
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The first Internal Revenue Code, enacted in 1939, contained
only eight provisions specifically addressing the federal income
tax consequences of partnerships and their partners.2' These
early provisions confirmed the partnership entity as exempt
from tax. They stated that the partners bear the partnership's
federal income tax in their individual capacities' and therefore
must include their "distributive shares" of the partnership's net
short-term and long-term capital gains or losses and ordinary
net income or loss.' In so stating, these early provisions in the
1939 Code set up the aggregate theory of partnership tax law
with the income and losses for tax purposes passing through the
partnership directly to the individual partners.
Because most unincorporated business organizations taxed
under the partnership provisions were probably organized as
simple general partnerships under state law and the widespread
market for tax shelter investments had not yet developed,' the
1939 Code probably sufficiently explained how to determine the
federal income tax consequences of the individual partners from
owning an interest in a partnership. Consequently, the Treasury
likely found it unnecessary to clarify the statutory provisions or
promulgate detailed regulations in order to prevent allocations
of the partnership's income and losses in a manner carrying no
ing from all sources during the preceding calendar year to every corporation,
joint-stock company or association, and every insurance company, organized in
the United States, no matter how created or organized, not including partner-
ships ....
Id. (emphasis added).
21. I.R.C. §§ 181-188 (1952).
22. Id. § 181 ("Individuals carrying on business in partnership shall be liable for
income tax only in their individual capacity.").
23. Id. § 182.
In computing the net income of each partner, he shall include, whether
or not distribution is made to him-
(a) As a part of his short-term capital gains or losses, his distributive share
of the net short-term capital gain or loss of the partnership.
(b) As a part of his long-term capital gains or losses, his distributive share of
the net long-term capital gain or loss of the partnership.
(c) His distributive share of the ordinary net income or the ordinary net loss
of the partnership, computed as provided in section 183(b).
Id.
24. See Hamill, Origins, supra note 1, at 1504-08, 1514-16 (examining early
partnership classification regulations that made it more difficult for limited partner-
ships to be taxed as partnerships).
[Vol. 51:2:603612
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economic consequences. When partners allocated their distribu-
tive shares of the partnership's items of taxable income and loss,
presumably these tax allocations followed the partners' economic
interests in the partnership. However, as the popularity of part-
nerships increased over time, taxpayers became dissatisfied with
the.increasing uncertainty resulting from the 1939 Code's sparse
provisions.' Questions about whether the aggregate theory of
partnership tax law applied to partnership liabilities which
would require corresponding increases to the partners' bases and
whether the Service possessed any power to challenge the
partners' distributive shares of partnership income and loss
numbered among the many unanswered issues posed by the
1939 Code.
The federal income tax law as applied to partnerships and
partners remained unchanged until Congress enacted Subchap-
ter K as part of the 1954 overhaul of the Internal Revenue
Code.' In enacting Subchapter K, Congress acknowledged that
the 1939 Code's provisions addressing partnerships left many
issues open.' Among the many issues addressed, the 1954
Code's provisions of the newly enacted Subchapter K made im-
portant additions concerning both the treatment of partnership
liabilities and the determination of the partners' distributive
shares of the partnership's income and losses. Unlike the 1939
Code, which failed to address the treatment of partnership lia-
bilities thus providing no authority for increasing the partners'
25. Jacob Rabkin & Mark H. Johnson, The Partnership Under the Federal Tax
Laws, 55 HARV. L. REV. 909 (1942) (revealing the numerous uncertainties that sur-
rounded the 1939 tax law governing partnerships).
26. Internal Revenue Service Code of 1956, .§§ 701-771, 68A Stat. 1, 239-54
(1954). Section 771 provided that Subchapter K applies to partnerships with a tax-
able year beginning after December 31, 1954.
27. See H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 65 (1954); S. REP. No. 83-1622, at 89 (1954).
Congress described the problem as follows:
The existing tax treatment of partners and partnerships is among the most
confused in the entire income tax field. The present statutory provisions are
wholly inadequate. The published regulations, rulings, and court decisions are
incomplete and frequently contradictory. As a result partners today cannot
form, operate, or dissolve a partnership with any assurance as to tax conse-
quences. . . . Because of the vital need for clarification, your committee has
undertaken the first comprehensive statutory treatment of partners and part-
nerships in the history of the income tax laws.
H.R. REP. No. 83-1337, at 65; S. REP. No. 83-1622, at 89.
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outside bases, the newly enacted § 752 in the 1954 Code contin-
ues the aggregate theory of taxing partnerships and partners by
clearly stating that partners receive an increase to their individ-
ual outside bases for their shares of partnership liabilities.'
Also, while the 1939 Code described the partners' "distribu-
tive shares" as a flow-through of a portion of the partnership's
income and loss, the statutory language did not contemplate the
Service reallocating invalid distributive shares.' For the first
time the 1954 Code statutorily recognized that the distributive
shares of partnership income and loss contractually agreed upon
by the partners could be invalid and therefore not respected for
taxpurposes. The language of the newly codified § 704(b) of the
1954 Code clearly permitted the Service to challenge and reallo-
cate distributive shares where "the principal purpose... is the
avoidance or evasion of any tax ..... 0
28. I.R.C. § 752 (1994). Although the Code treats a partner's share of partner-
ship liabilities as a deemed contribution of money, thus increasing outside basis, the
statute failed to indicate how the individual partners share partnership liabilities.
See infra notes 66-73.
29. I.R.C. § 182 (1952).
In computing the net income of each partner, he shall include, whether
or not distribution is made to him-
(a) As part of his short-term capital gains or losses, his distributive share of
the net short-term capital gain or loss of the partnership.
(b) As a part of his long-term capital gains or losses, his distributive share of
the net long-term capital gain or loss of the partnership.
(c) His distributive share of the ordinary net income or the ordinary net loss
of the partnership, computed as provided in section 183(b).
Id.
30. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 704(bX2), ch. 736, 68A Stat. 1, 239 (1954).
DISTRIBUTWE SHARE DETERMINED BY INCOME OR LOSS RATIO.-
A partner's distributive share of any item of income, gain, loss, deduction, or
credit shall be determined in accordance with his distributive share of taxable
income or loss of the partnership, as described in section 702(aX9), for the
taxable year, if-
(1) the partnership agreement does not provide as to the partner's dis-
tributive share of such item, or
(2) the principal purpose of any provision in the partnership agreement
with respect to the partner's distributive share of such item is the avoidance
or evasion of any tax imposed by this subtitle.
Id. § 704(b).
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B. Historical Trail of Authorities Addressing Distributive
Shares of Partnership Taxable Income and Loss Under § 704(b)
Despite the material improvements offered by the statutory
language of the 1954 Code's version of § 704(b) governing dis-
tributive shares, two major issues continued to persist. Although
the former language of § 704(b) clearly empowered the Service to
reallocate items of partnership income or loss that must be sepa-
rately stated (for example capital gains and losses) if the
partners' allocations met the tax avoidance standard, the provi-
sion failed to address whether the Service could reallocate a
partnership's net ordinary taxable income or loss, known as
bottom-line taxable income or loss."' By only covering distribu-
tive shares of the partnership's separately stated items, the 1954
version of § 704(b) left a material loophole which allowed alloca-
tions of partnership bottom-line ordinary income and loss to
vary from the economic benefits and burdens associated with the
distributive shares.3 2 Moreover, the regulations promulgated a
31. IR.C. § 704(b) (1970). Section 702 requires a number of income and loss dis-
tributive shares to be separately stated due to the tax consequences at the partner
level varying from the treatment of ordinary income and ordinary loss (e.g., capital
gains and losses, charitable contributions, certain dividends, foreign taxes, tax-exempt
bond interest).
32. The 1954 version of § 704(b) provided that, unless otherwise provided by the
partnership agreement or for the principal purpose of the "avoidance or evasion of
any tax," a partner's distributive share was to be allocated in accordance with his
distributive share of partnership income or loss as provided in § 702(aX9). Id. Under
§ 702(aX9), each partner was allocated his distributive share of the partnership's
"bottom-line" taxable income or loss, excluding items that were to be reported sepa-
rately. Items that were to be reported separately included the following. (1) gains
and losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets held for not more than six
months, (2) gains and losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets held for not
more than six months, (3) gains and losses from sales or exchanges of property de-
scribed in § 1231, (4) charitable contributions, (5) dividends with respect to which
there is provided an exclusion under § 116 or a deduction under part VIII of sub-
chapter B, (6) taxes described in § 901, paid or accrued to foreign countries and
possessions of the United States, (7) partially tax-exempt interest on obligations of
the United States or on obligations of instrumentalities of the United States as
described in § 35 or §. 242, and (8) other items of income, gain, loss, deduction or
credit provided by the regulations. Id § 702(aX9).
Despite the statutory language that contemplated special allocations of bottom
line profit or loss being above challenge by the Service, some commentators dis-
agreed with this conclusion stating that "substance prevails over form .... It is the
author's conclusion that while § 704(b) does not apply specifically to the allocation of
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few years after Congress enacted the 1954 Code's version of
§ 704(b) also failed to require the partners' distributive shares of
bottom-line taxable income and loss to reflect their economic
rights to the partnership's assets or exposure to the
partnership's economic losses."
In addition, the "avoidance or evasion of any tax" language
established a very vague standard defining when a partnership's
separately stated allocations could be reallocated by the Ser-
vice.' However, the regulations promulgated under the 1954
version of § 704(b) somewhat clarified the vague "avoidance or
evasion of any tax" language by detailing a list of relevant fac-
tors to consider in deciding whether the principal purpose of an
allocation was for the avoidance of tax. These factors were: (1)
whether the partnership or a partner individually had a busi-
ness purpose for the allocation; (2) whether the allocation had
"substantial economic effect"3"; (3) whether related items of in-
bottom line profit or loss, nevertheless there must be business and economic reality
to any special allocation of § 702(aX9) [bottom line] income." 1 ARTHUR B. WILLIS ET
AL., PARTNERSHIP TAXATION § 25.11, at 317-18 (2d ed. 1976); see also 1 WILLIAM S.
MCKEE ET AL., supra note 12, 10.0112], at 10-6 (1st ed. 1977) (discussing how
bottom line losses were arguably subject to reallocation by the Service under
§ 704(b)). But see Holladay v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 571, 586-87 (1979) (finding the
Commissioner's concession that § 704(bX2)'s tax avoidance test for allocations is
inapplicable to allocations of bottom line income or loss in § 702(aX9)); Boynton v.
Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1147, 1174 (1977) ("The Commissioner has conceded that as a
matter of statutory construction § 704(bX2) is inapplicable to this case which in-
volves an attempted allocation of overall or 'bottom line' losses described in
§ 702(aX9) rather than an allocation of any of the 'items' described in § 702(aXl)-
702(aX8)."); Kresser v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1621, 1631 n.5 (1970) (deciding the
issue of whether to reallocate a partnership's bottom line taxable income that lacked
economic substance, but because the allocations failed to pass the economic sub-
stance test, the court did not have to decide whether § 704(bX2) applied only to the
items listed in § 702(aXl) through (8) and not to bottom line income or loss in
§ 702(aX9)).
33. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(bXl) (1957).
If the partnership agreement makes no specific provision for the manner of
sharing one or more items or classes of items, a partner's distributive share of
such items shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of the part-
nership agreement for the division of the general profits or losses (that is, the
taxable income or loss of the partnership described in section 702(aX9)).
Id.
34. THOMAS CRICHTON, IV ET AL., PARTNERSHIP-TAXABLE INCOME; ALLOCATION
OF DISTRIBUTIVE SHARES; CAPITAL ACCOUNTS A-48 (Tax Management Portfolios No.
712, 3d ed. 1993).
35. The regulations defined "substantial economic effect" as "whether the alloca-
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come, gain, loss, deduction, or credit from the same source were
subject to the same allocation; (4) whether the allocation was
made without recognition of normal business factors and only
after the amount of the specially allocated item could reasonably
be estimated; (5) what was the duration of the allocation; and (6)
what were the overall tax consequences of the allocation.' De-
spite this extensive list of considerations, the courts' interpreta-
tions of the "avoidance or evasion of any tax" standard focused
on whether the allocation had "substantial economic effect."'
Orrisch v. Commissioner, an early case, addressed whether
special allocations met the "avoidance or evasion of any tax"
standard while relying primarily on the "substantial economic
effect" concept." In Orrisch, the partners agreed to share part-
nership gains and losses equally, while specially allocating all
the depreciation deductions to one partner. The partner receiv-
ing all the depreciation deductions had substantial income from
other sources while the other partner did not. 9 Consequently
the special allocation substantially reduced the first partner's
tax liability without increasing the second partner's tax liability.
The Service challenged the special allocation of the depreciation
deductions under § 704(b) as designed primarily for tax avoid-
ance purposes."° Despite the court's acknowledgment of the
regulations' list of factors, the court appeared to place the
greatest weight on the "substantial economic effect" test and its
reliance on maintaining capital accounts.4' In order for the spe-
tion may actually affect the dollar amount of the partners' shares of the total part-
nership income or loss independently of tax consequences." Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (as
amended by T.D. 6175, 1956-1 C.B. 211, 220).
36. Id. § 1.704-1(bX2).
37. Holladay, 72 T.C. 571, 587-88 (1979); Boynton, 72 T.C. 1147, 1159-61 (1979);
Harris v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 770, 786 (1974); Orrisch v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.
395, 403 (1970). The concept of "substantial economic effect" was first introduced- in
the Senate Committee on Finance Report on the 1954 Code. S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at
379 (1954). In explaining when the tax avoidance limitation of § 704(b) would be
used to disregard a partnership allocation, the Senate report explained that where "a
provision in a partnership agreement for a special allocation of certain items has
substantial economic effect and is not merely a device for reducing the taxes of cer-
tain partners without actually affecting their shares of partnership income, then
such a provision will be recognized for tax purposes." Id. (emphasis added).
38. 55 T.C. 395 (1970).
39. Orrisch, 55 T.C. at 396-97.
40. Id. at 395.
41. Id. at 400-04.
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cial allocation to have "substantial economic effect," the court
stated that the partner receiving the special allocation must
decrease his capital account accordingly, causing him to either
receive a smaller share of the assets on liquidation or bear a
larger share of any payments to the partnership's creditors if
partnership assets are insufficient to satisfy all claims.42 The
court held that the partners' agreement failed to economically
reduce the recipient partner's capital account for the special
allocation of depreciation and, in the event of liquidation, the
partners intended an equal division of the partnership's assets
or liabilities if contributions were necessary to pay creditors.43
Thus the court held that the special allocation of depreciation
met the tax avoidance standard under § 704(b) and the regula-
tions justifying the Service's reallocation of fifty percent of the
depreciation deductions to the other partner."
The next major change of partnership tax law addressing
allocations of distributive shares occurred in 1976, when the Tax
Reform Act of 19764" solved both of the problems with the 1954
version of § 704(b). First, the 1976 version of § 704(b) empow-
ered the Service to reallocate a partner's distributive share of all
partnership items, both separately stated and bottom-line.'
Second, the statutory language of § 704(b) abandoned the "avoid-
ance or evasion of any tax" language and adopted the "substan-
tial economic effect" language.47 Despite the formal codification
of the "substantial economic effect" standard, the legislative
history states that the change was intended to be entirely con-
sistent with prior law,4" which leaves Orrisch and similar cases
42. Id. at 403-04.
43. Id. at 403-04.
44. Orrisch, 55 T.C. at 404.
45. The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
46. Id. § 704(b), at 1548 (currently codified at I.R.C. § 704(b) (1994)); see also S.
REP. No. 94-938, at 99 (1976) ("The committee believes that an overall allocation of
the taxable income or loss for a taxable year (described under section 702(aX9))
should be subject to disallowance in the same manner as allocations of an item of
income or loss.").
47. I.R.C. § 704(b).
48. S. REP. No. 94-938, at 99-100 (1976). The Joint Committee Explanation of
the change provides:
The Act provides that an allocation of overall income or loss . . . . or of any
item of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit .... shall be controlled by the
partnership agreement if the partner receiving the allocation can demonstrate
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that were decided under the 1954 version of § 704(b) intact as
good law. Section 704(b), as amended in 1976, serves as the
governing provision today.49
Starting in 1983 with a set of proposed regulations, the
Service began providing guidelines and examples interpreting
the statutory language of § 704(b) as amended in 1976.' In
1985, the Service issued the final § 704(b) regulations, which
continue to operate as the governing provision for all dis-
tributive shares of partnership income and losses that carry the
potential for economic benefits or burdens.51 The 1985 regula-
tions state that the allocations of partnership income and losses
in the partnership agreement will be respected if: (1) taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances, the allocations are
in accordance with the partners' interests in the partnership;52
(2) the allocations have substantial economic effect; or (3) the
allocations are deemed to be in accordance with the partners'
interests in the partnership.' In turn, the substantial economic
effect standard introduces a two-part mechanical test for ensur-
ing that the tax allocations match the economic benefits and
burdens.' If the partners' allocations do not satisfy one of these
three tests, the Service possesses the power to reallocate the tax
allocations in accordance with the partners' true economic inter-
that it has "substantial economic effect," i.e., whether the allocation may actu-
ally affect the dollar amount of the partner's share of the total partnership
income or loss, independent of tax consequences.
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976 95 (Joint Comm. Print 1976).
49. I.R.C. § 704(b) (1994). Section 704(b), as amended in 1976, applies to part-
nership taxable years beginning after December 31, 1975. Pub. L. No. 94-455,
§ 213(f)(1).
50. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b), 48 Fed. Reg. 9871 (1983).
51. Tress. Reg. § 1.704-1(b) (as amended by T.D. 8065, 1986-1 C.B. 254). The
final regulations differed significantly from the proposed regulations. In the 1985
final regulations, the Treasury expressly reserved for a later time the promulgation
of regulations relating to allocations attributable to nonrecourse liabilities.
52. Id. § 1.704-1(b). Factors to be considered included (1) the partners' relative
contributions to the partnership, (2) the partners' interests in economic profits and
losses (if different from taxable income or loss), (3) the partners' interests in cash
flow and other nonliquidating distributions, and (4) the partners' rights to distribu-
tions of capital upon liquidation. Id. § 1.704-1(bX3Xii).
53. See id. § 1.704-1(bX4) (rules for allocations reflecting certain revaluations of
property) and § 1.704-2 (rules for allocations attributable to nonrecourse liabilities).
54. Id. § 1.704-1(bX2). For a detailed discussion of the mechanical safe harbor
establishing substantial economic effect, see supra Part I.A.
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ests in the partnership.'
In addition to addressing allocations of income and losses
carrying the potential of economic benefits and burdens, the set
of proposed regulations issued in 1983 contained the basic con-
cepts dealing with allocations attributable to nonrecourse liabili-
ties which cannot carry any potential of economic benefits or
burdens. Although the mechanical rules contained only sparse
details, the 1983 proposed regulations recognized that losses at-
tributable to nonrecourse liabilities, known as nonrecourse de-
ductions, and the income restoring those deductions, known as
minimum gain, could not have substantial economic effect. The
1983 proposed regulations first articulated the standard of mea-
suring the existence of nonrecourse deductions and minimum
gain at the partnership level by comparing the face amount of
the nonrecourse liability and the basis of any property securing
that liability.56 Although the 1985 final regulations covering
allocations with substantial economic effect or otherwise consis-
tent with the partners' interests in the partnership did not ad-
dress allocations attributable to nonrecourse liabilities, a year
later in 1986 the Treasury promulgated final regulations provid-
ing guidelines for allocating distributive shares of nonrecourse
deductions.57 The fundamental guidelines contained in the 1986
final regulations, including the mechanical calculation of nonre-
course deductions being tied to minimum gain increases, first
appeared in the 1983 proposed regulations."
The 1986 regulations, however, contained some major prob-
lems that needed to be addressed with additional regulatory
amendments. The 1986 regulations failed to impose a minimum
gain chargeback requirement to offset the nonrecourse deduc-
tions and did not address allocations attributable to partner
nonrecourse debt, which refers to liabilities that are nonrecourse
under state law to the partnership as the borrower where a
partner nevertheless bears the economic risk of lOSS. 59 On De-
55. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(bX1) (as amended by T.D. 8065, 1986-1 C.B. 254). The
facts and circumstances test deems allocations in accordance with the partners' inter-
ests in the partnership by taking into consideration factors that affect the partners'
economic arrangement.
56. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(bX4Xiv), 48 Fed. Reg. 9871 (1983).
57. T.D. 8099, 1986-2 C.B. 84.
58. Id. at 86-87.
59. Id. at 87. Under the 1986 final regulations, allocations attributable to non-
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cember 30, 1988, the Treasury issued temporary regulations
that identified and corrected problems with the 1986 regulatory
treatment of allocations attributable to nonrecourse liabilities.'
In addition to providing a elaborate set of mechanical rules
measuring the existence of nonrecourse deductions and mini-
mum gain, the 1988 Temporary Regulations required the part-
nership agreement to contain a minimum gain chargeback provi-
sion as a condition to meeting the safe harbor for allocating
nonrecourse deductions. The 1988 Temporary Regulations also
created a parallel regime mirroring the nonrecourse allocation
rules covering allocations attributable to partner nonrecourse
liabilities."' In 1991, the Treasury issued § 1.704-2, the final
portion of the § 704(b) regulations which continue to serve as
the governing authority for allocations attributable to nonre-
course and partner nonrecourse liabilities. 2 These regulations
vastly simplify the language of the 1988 Temporary Regulations
and eliminate the "complexity of the two-prong calculation"' by
recourse liabilities could meet the safe harbor without a minimum gain chargeback
provision if the partnership agreement satisfied Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(bX2XiiXbX3),
which required capital account maintenance, liquidation according to positive capital
accounts, and an unlimited obligation to restore any deficit capital account. Id. As a
practical matter, very few partnerships meet this standard because state law does
not automatically provide an unlimited obligation to restore a deficit capital account
to pay off nonrecourse debt, and no partner would agree as a business matter to
give up the protection from personal liability granted by the nonrecourse aspect of
debt to avoid a minimum gain chargeback.
60. T.D. 8237, 1989-1 C.B. 180 (amended by T.D. 8274, 1989-2 C.B. 101).
61. Id. at 203. Another example of an important change made by the 1988 Tem-
porary Regulations involved, the treatment of. distributions to a partner attributable
to proceeds of a nonrecourse liability. Under the 1986 final regulations, distributions
of proceeds of a nonrecourse liability could result in a deficit capital account in ex-
cess of a partner's deficit restoration obligation because a share of minimum gain
did not follow the distribution; however, under the 1988 Temporary Regulations dis-
tributions of proceeds of a nonrecourse liability carried with them the minimum gain
chargeback requirement through a share of minimum gain. Id. at 183.
62. T.D. 8385, 1992-1 C.B. 199. Note that final regulations under I.R.C. § 752
were issued contemporaneously with the final § 704(b) regulations. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.752-1 to -4 (as amended by T.D. 8380, 1992-1 C.B. 218).
63. T.D. 8385, 1992-1 C.B. 199, 202 (noting that the two-prong approach was
"heavily criticized in the comments"). Under the temporary regulations, the minimum
gain chargeback was the greater of: (1) the partner's share of the net decrease in
partnership minimum gain attributable to a disposition of partnership property sub-
ject to nonrecourse liabilities or (2) the partner's deficit capital account balance. T.D.
8237, 1989-1 C.B. 180, 203-04. Problems with this minimum gain chargeback compu-
tation arose when the debt was converted, refinanced or otherwise modified, result-
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basing the minimum gain chargeback exclusively on the
partners' shares of the partnership's net decrease in minimum
gain while providing exceptions to the minimum gain
chargeback requirement.'
C. Historical Trail of Authorities Addressing the Partners'
Shares of Partnership Liabilities Under § 752
The current statutory language of § 752, which provides the
authority for increasing the partners' outside bases to reflect
shares of the partnership's liabilities, reads identically to the
language that first appeared in the 1954 Code.' According to
ing in inappropriate chargebacks under the second prong. Also, the calculations cre-
ated economic distortions when partners restored their nonrecourse allocations
through income allocations or capital contributions before there was a net decrease
in minimum gain in the partnership.
64. T.D. 8385, 1992-1 C.B. 199, 202. A partner's share of the partnership's net
decrease in minimum gain is computed by his percentage share of the partnership's
total minimum gain. The regulations set forth detailed effective dates and transition-
al rules that apply to the different sets of regulations. The effective dates for the
regulations governing nonrecourse deductions are generally as follows: (1) the 1991
regulations apply to partnership taxable years beginning after December 27, 1991,
id. at 209-210; (2) the 1988 temporary regulations apply to partnership taxable years
beginning after December 29, 1988 and before December 28, 1991, id.; and (3) the
1986 regulations apply to taxable years after December 31, 1975 and before Decem-
ber 29, 1988. T.D. 8099, 1986-2 C.B. 84, 84-85. The regulations set forth detailed
and complex transition rules.
65. I.R.C. § 752 (1954). Section 752 introduced in 1954 is identical to the cur-
rent § 752. Section 752 provides:
Treatment of certain liabilities.
(a) Increase in partner's liabilities.
Any increase in a partner's share of the liabilities of a partnership, or
any increase in a partner's individual liabilities by reason of the assumption
by such partner of partnership liabilities, shall be considered as a contribution
of money by such partner to the partnership.
(b) Decrease in partner's liabilities.
Any decrease in a partner's share of the liabilities of a partnership, or
any decrease in a partner's individual liabilities by reason of the assumption
by the partnership of such individual liabilities, shall be considered as a dis-
tribution of money to the partner by the partnership.
(c) Liability to which property is subject.
For purposes of this section, a liability to which property is subject
shall, to the extent of the fair market value of such property, be considered as
a liability of the owner of the property.
(d) Sale or exchange of an interest.
In the case of a sale or exchange of an interest in a partnership, liabili-
2000] Section 704(b)'s Application to LLCs and LLPs
one commentator, the liability sharing rules introduced in 1954
were "welcomed by Federal income tax practitioners... [be-
cause] for the first time the troublesome subject of how to deal
with the liabilities of a partnership in direct relation to its part-
ners were [sic] defined and made workable."' Under § 752 a
partner has a share of partnership liabilities either by assuming
a partnership liability or by the partnership itself incurring
liabilities. In both cases, the partner's outside basis includes the
partner's share of the liabilities. Section 752 increases the
partner's outside basis by treating the amount of the partner's
share of liabilities as a contribution of money by the partner to
the partnership. On the other hand, when the partner's share of
partnership liabilities decreases, either when the partnership
assumes the partner's personal liabilities or the liabilities of the
partnership itself are decreased (for example as the partnership
pays down the principal of a loan), § 752 reduces the partner's
outside basis by treating the amount of the decrease as a distri-
bution by the partnership to the partner. The statutory language
of § 752 provides no guidance addressing how the partners de-
termine their individual shares of the partnership's liabilities.'7
Because § 704(d) suspends all losses once the partner's outside
basis reaches zero,' a partner's share of partnership liabilities
often plays a critical role in determining whether the partner
has sufficient outside basis to absorb the distributive share of
losses.
In 1956, the Treasury issued the first set of regulations
ties shall be treated in the same manner as liabilities in connection with the
sale or exchange of property not associated with partnerships.
Id.
66. 1 J.M. BARRET & ERWIN SEAGO, PARTNERS & PARTNERHmPs LAw & TAX'N
§ 5 (1st ed. 1956).
67. See I.R.C. § 752(a)-(b) (1994).
68. Id. § 704(d).
A partner's distributive share of partnership loss (including capital loss) shall
be allowed only to the extent of the adjusted basis of such partner's interest
in the partnership at the end of the partnership year in which such loss oc-
curred. Any excess of such loss over such basis shall be allowed as a deduc-
tion at the end of the partnership year in which such excess is repaid to the
partnership.
Id. A partner would need to calculate outside basis under other circumstances as




under § 752 that provide guidance for determining the partners'
shares of partnership liabilities.69 These short and concise early
regulations did not differentiate between "recourse" and "nonre-
course" liabilities, but rather classified liabilities based on
whether a partner had "any personal liability with respect to a
partnership liability" and provided only few examples.7" Es-
sentially, under these regulations, recourse liabilities were allo-
cated among the partners in accordance with the ratio by which
they agreed to share losses, and nonrecourse liabilities were
allocated in accordance with the ratio by which they agreed to
share profits.7 '
The guidance provided by the 1956 regulations ultimately
proved to be inadequate as commercial loan arrangements be-
came more sophisticated. As part of the Tax Reform Act of 1984,
Congress issued a directive to the Treasury to promulgate addi-
tional regulations under § 752 to "be based largely on the man-
ner in which the partners, and persons related to the partners,
share the economic risk of loss with respect to partnership debt
(other than bona fide nonrecourse debt ... )."12 In 1988, the
Treasury issued temporary regulations that set forth in greater
detail how to determine a partner's share of partnership liabili-
ties and defined all liabilities as either recourse, meaning at
least one partner bore the risk of loss if the partnership failed to
pay the liability, or nonrecourse, meaning no partner bore the
economic risk of loss.73 To determine whether partnership lia-
bilities are recourse or nonrecourse the temporary regulations
set up an elaborate process, known as constructive liquidation.
In addition to separating recourse and nonrecourse debt, the
process also identified which partners bore the risk of loss for
shares of recourse debt.74 The 1988 Temporary Regulations
69. T.D. 6175, 1956-1 C.B. 211, 298.
70. Id. at 1956-1 C.B. 211, 300.
71. For a thorough discussion of the early regulations, see 1 WILLIAM S. MCKEE
ET AL., supra note 12, 9 8.02(1], at 8-6 to -8 (2d ed. 1990).
72. H.R. REP. No. 98-861, at 869 (1984); see also STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM.
ON TAX'N, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE
DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984 250-52 (Joint Comm. Print 1984).
73. T.D. 8237, 1989-1 C.B. 180, 184-85 (as amended by T.D. 8274, 1989-2 C.B.
101).
74. Id. The 1988 temporary regulations also amended § 1.704-1 to directly coor-
dinate the allocation rules under § 704(b) and liability sharing rules under § 752 in
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were highly criticized,75 and the Treasury responded by adopt-
ing final regulations, published on December 23, 1991,8 which
greatly simplified the language of the temporary regulations.
The 1991 final § 752 regulations, which currently remain in
effect, have been praised as a "more concise version" of the 1988
Temporary Regulations.77
the case of allocations attributable to nonrecourse debt. The relationship between
§ 704(b)'s allocation rules and § 752's liability sharing rules was acknowledged in
the preamble to § 752's temporary regulations issued in 1988:
The economic risk of loss analysis employed in the temporary regula-
tions generally corresponds to, and further develops, the economic risk of loss
analysis employed in the regulations under section 704(b). The coordination of
these two sections reflects the fact that one of the principal purposes for in-
cluding partnership liabilities in the bases of the partners' interests in the
partnership is to support the deductions that will be claimed by the partners
for the items attributable to those liabilities.
... [T]he coordination of the economic risk of loss analysis employed in
sections 704(b) and 752 generally requires that the basis for a partnership
liability be allocated to the partner that will be allocated the deductions at-
tributable of [sic] that liability.
T.D. 8237, 1989-1 C.B. 180, 182. The final §§ 752 and 704(b) regulations, issued in
conjunction with one another, ensure that allocations of partnership nonrecourse
liabilities under § 704(b) are consistent with § 752's liability sharing rules. Partners
who are entitled to allocations attributable to nonrecourse liabilities under § 704(b)
will receive the necessary outside basis increase for a share of the partnership's
nonrecourse liabilities that will support the nonrecourse deductions. I.R.C. § 705(aXl)
(1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3 (1991); id. § 1.752-1(c).
75. E.g., Howard E. Abrams, Long-Awaited Regulations Under Section 752 Pro-
vide Wrong Answers, 44 TAX L. REV. 627 (1989); William P. Bowers & Michael K.
Stone, The Section 752 Regulations: A Critical Analysis, 68 TAXES 99, 123 (1990);
Mark P. Gergen, Disproportionate Loss Allocations, 48 TAX NOTES 1051, 1054-55
(1990).
76. T.D. 8380, 1992-1 C.B. 218. The final § 752 regulations apply to liabilities
incurred or assumed by a partnership after December 27, 1991.
77. LISA MARIE STARCZEWSKI, PARTNERS s-ALLOCATIONS OF LIABILITIES; BASIC
RULES A-17 (Tax Management Portfolios No. 714, 3d. ed. 1995) (praising the final
regulations as a "much more concise version" of the 1988 regulations); 1 ARTHUR B.
WILLIS ET AL., supra note 32, § 6.01[1], at 6-5, -6 (6th ed. 1997).
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III. DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE REGULATIONS GOVERNING
ALLOCATIONS OF DISTRIBUTIVE SHARES UNDER § 704(b) AND
SHARES OF PARTNERSHIP LIABILITIES UNDER § 752
A. The Rules For Achieving Substantial Economic Effect and
for Sharing Liabilities Based on Economic Risk of Loss
The § 704(b) regulations use detailed rules to ensure that
allocations are "consistent with the underlying economic ar-
rangement of the partners.""8 Distributive shares of taxable
income carry corresponding rights to shares of the assets of the
partnership while distributive shares of taxable loss carry a
corresponding share of any economic burden associated with
that loss. 9 If a partnership agreement complies with the regu-
latory rules for establishing substantial economic effect, general-
ly the Service cannot challenge the partnership's tax alloca-
tions.8 The "substantial economic effect" safe harbor entails a
two-part analysis at the end of the partnership's taxable year:
(1) "the allocation must have economic effect," and (2) "the eco-
nomic effect of the allocation must be substantial."8 '
The standard for establishing "economic effect" comprises a
mechanical web of rules providing a safe harbor that, if met,
conclusively treats the distributive shares of income and losses
for income tax purposes as corresponding to the partners' shares
of the partnership's economic benefits and burdens. 2 The eco-
nomic effect safe harbor can be broken down into three compo-
nents that must not only appear in the partnership agreement,
but in fact, must reflect the partners' true economic arrange-
78. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(bX2Xii) (as amended in 1985).
79. The regulations explain this concept as follows: "[iun the event there is an
economic benefit or economic burden that corresponds to an allocation, the partner
to whom the allocation is made must receive such economic benefit or bear such
economic burden." Id. § 1.704-1(bX2XiiXa).
80. Id. § 1.704-1(b). But see supra note 13 (discussing other provisions that al-
low the Service to challenge the validity of a distributive share or suspend the de-
ductibility of losses until some point in the future).
81. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(bX2Xi).
82. Id. § 1.704-1(bX2Xii).
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ment." The three conditions for meeting the economic effect
safe harbor are as follows: (1) the partnership must maintain
capital accounts in accordance with § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv); (2) the
partnership must liquidate in accordance with the partners'
positive capital accounts; and (3) all partners showing deficits in
their individual capital accounts must have unconditional obliga-
tions to restore the deficit (within ninety days of the liquidation
of the partnership or the partner's interest) for the benefit of
partners with positive capital account balances or the
partnership's creditors.' The partners may also satisfy the
third requirement addressing deficit capital accounts by meeting
the alternate test for economic effect, if one or more partners
does not have an unconditional obligation to restore a deficit
capital account regardless of the amount."
The requirement that the partners maintain capital ac-
counts represents the cornerstone of the economic effect safe
harbor. Proper positive and negative adjustments to the individ-
ual capital accounts, combined with the corresponding conse-
quences affecting the partners' business arrangements for shar-
ing the partnership's net worth or obligations to make payments
or contributions on the partnership's behalf, cause the tax dis-
tributive shares to conform to the economic arrangement among
the partners. A positive capital account generally reflects a
partner's share of the partnership's economic net worth, while a
83. Id.
84. Id § 1.704-1(bX2XiiXb). Treasury Regulation § 1.704-1(bX2XiiXi) provides
another means by which a partnership's allocations can be deemed to have "econom-
ic effect-the "economic effect equivalence" test. The economic effect equivalence test
provides that tax allocations that do not satisfy the "economic effect" safe harbor
will nevertheless be respected if, at the end of the partnership's taxable year, a
liquidation of the partnership would produce the same economic results as would
result if the partners met the economic effect safe harbor. Id. Thus, under the eco-
nomic effect equivalence test, if at the end of the partnership taxable year the
partnership's allocations are equivalent to the partners' economic rights, the Service
will deem the allocations to have "economic effect" despite the fact that the alloca-
tions fail to comply with the regulatory requirements. The "economic effect equiva-
lence" language in the regulations serves as a backstop to protect unsophisticated
business participants, who may not even have a written partnership agreement, from
having their allocations successfully challenged when, in fact, the partners' tax dis-
tributive shares are following the business arrangement. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-
l(bX2XiiXi).




negative capital account broadly represents what the partner
owes the partnership.'
Although mechanically the capital account maintenance
portion of the economic effect safe harbor seems enormously
complex, most of the actual adjustments required by the rules
boil down to a few basic business concepts. The capital account
maintenance rules require an increase for money as well as the
fair market value of property (net of liabilities) contributed to
the partnership. 7 Moreover, all allocations of partnership in-
come and gain (including income and gain exempt from tax) also
must come with a corresponding increase to the partners' indi-
vidual capital accounts." The capital account maintenance
rules require a decrease for money as well as the fair market
value of property (net of liabilities) distributed to the partner.8
Moreover, all allocations of partnership losses and deductions
(including those expenditures that cannot be deducted or added
to the basis of the property) must come with a corresponding
decrease to the partners' individual capital accounts." By re-
quiring the capital account increases and decreases to reflect
contributions, distributions and distributive shares of income
and losses, these rules set up a system that requires the
partners' distributive shares of the partnership's items of income
or loss for tax purposes to correspond to how the partners share
economic resources.
The requirement that partners liquidate in accordance with
their positive capital account balances ensures that at some
point (liquidation representing the last possible moment) the
partners actually receive their respective shares of the
partnership's wealth. If the partners have been following the
capital account maintenance rules, their positive capital ac-
counts, representing their shares of the partnership's net worth,
will reflect their contributions, distributions and past distrib-
utive shares of partnership income and loss.9' The regulations
define liquidation as occurring on the earlier of the partnership's





91. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(bX2XiiXbX2) (as amended in 1997).
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liquidation or the liquidation of a partner's individual interest in
the partnership. 2 To comply with this portion of the economic
effect safe harbor, a partner must have the right to receive the
entire balance of the positive capital account at liquidation.'
The adjustments required by capital account maintenance
throughout the life of the partnership and the final determina-
tion of the partners' economic rights at liquidation allow operat-
ing distributions to be made in any ratio that suits the business
needs of the partners.
The third portion of the economic effect safe harbor focuses
on the requirements if one or more partners receive a distribu-
tive share of losses that causes or increases a deficit capital
account. 4 Unless the distributive share of losses causing or cre-
ating a deficit capital account has been properly labeled a nonre-
course deduction, the partner must be obligated to make a con-
tribution, known as a "deficit restoration obligation," to restore
the deficit.95 The regulations require such contributions to be
made no later than ninety days after the liquidation of the part-
nership or the partner's interest." If a deficit capital account
results from a loss allocation properly labeled a nonrecourse
deduction, the regulations do not require a deficit restoration
obligation because those losses will be offset with later income
allocations carrying no rights to the partnership's economic net
worth." The deficit restoration obligation can either be unlimit-
ed or limited.' A limited deficit restoration obligation requires
a partner to restore a deficit up to a defined amount," while an
unlimited deficit restoration obligation requires a partner to un-
92. Id. § 1.704-1(bX2)ii(g); id. § 1.761-1(d).
93. See id § 1.704-1(b)2(ii(b).
94. Id. § 1.704-1(bX2XiiXbX3).
95. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(bX2XiiXbX3).
96. Id.
97. See generally id. § 1.704-2 (as amended in 1991).
98. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(bX2XiiXbX3). A partner should never agree to an
unlimited deficit restoration obligation; rather, the partnership should comply with
the alternate test. See infra text accompanying notes 103-12.
99. In the event of a limited deficit restoration obligation, an allocation can
have partial economic effect, in which case the Service will respect the allocation to
the extent that it has partial economic effect, and the balance will be reallocated in
accordance with the partners' interests in the partnership. See Tress. Reg. § 1.704-
1(bX2XiiXcXl) (as amended in 1997).
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conditionally restore a deficit regardless of the amount.'" The
legal obligation that creates a partner's deficit restoration obli-
gation can arise under state law, the partnership agreement, or
a side agreement.''
The alternate test applies anytime a partnership agreement
or state law fails to impose unlimited deficit restoration obliga-
tions on all partners to cover any current or potential future
partnership losses. Only general partnerships, due to the joint
and several personal liability borne by all partners, impose, as a
matter of state law, unlimited deficit restoration obligations on
all partners."° Consequently, many unincorporated business
organizations taxed as partnerships (which includes LLCs and
LLPs as well as limited partnerships) must comply with the
alternate test in order to meet the economic effect safe har-
bor.10 3 The alternate test requires that all deficit capital ac-
counts either created by or increased due to a distributive share
of losses not properly labeled as nonrecourse deductions be cov-
ered dollar for dollar by a limited obligation to restore the defi-
cit.' 04 The alternate test has two additional requirements de-
signed to ensure that the limited obligation to restore in fact
covers the entire deficit capital account.0 5 First, the capital ac-
count must be adjusted hypothetically for certain expected deb-
its, for example, an expected distribution that will not be
matched with an income allocation."° This hypothetical down-
ward adjustment to the capital account is made solely to mea-
sure how large the limited deficit restoration obligation must be
when testing the economic effect of the distributive shares of
actual tax losses that year.0 7 This hypothetical adjustment en-
100. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(bX2XiiXcX2).
101. Id. § 1.704-1(bX2XiiXc).
102. See infra notes 223-27 and accompanying text (discussing loss allocations in
the context of general partnerships).
103. See infra notes 228-30 and accompanying text (discussing loss allocations in
the context of limited partnerships and the need for all limited partnerships to meet
the alternate test; because LLCs and LLPs offer limited liability protection to all
members and partners, state law imposes no unlimited deficit restoration obligation
on members of LLCs or partners of LLPs rendering it essential for all LLCs and
LLPs to meet the alternate test for economic effect). See id.
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sures that the limited deficit restoration obligation that supports
a current distributive share of taxable loss will be large enough
to cover both the actual loss and the expected debit to the cap-
ital account in the future."°
The partnership agreement must also include a "qualified
income offset" provision."° A qualified income offset will be
triggered in the event of certain unexpected debits to a partner's
capital account, for example, a distribution without a matching
income allocation, creating a deficit capital account balance
without a corresponding obligation to restore the deficit.1 If a
distribution or other event activates the qualified income offset
provision, the partner whose capital account unexpectedly has
dropped below any corresponding limited deficit restoration
obligation must receive an allocation of income or gain "in an
amount and manner sufficient to eliminate such deficit balance
as quickly as possible.""' Allocations of income and gain pur-
suant to a qualified income offset must consist of a pro rata
share of each item of partnership income and gain for the tax-
able year."
108. Id. For example, assume that a $100 loss allocated by a limited partnership
to a limited partner brings her capital account balance from $100 to zero, but she
expects to receive a $50 distribution at a future time that will have no matching
income allocation. Further assume that the partners expect the limited partnership
to incur a $50 recourse loan and distribute the proceeds to the limited partner.
Because the distribution comes from recourse debt proceeds, there will be no match-
ing income allocation or share of minimum gain, and the general partner will bear
the economic risk of loss for the debt. The alternate test requires that her capital
account be reduced not by just the $100 current distributive share of taxable loss
but also by the $50 expected distribution. Consequently in order for the distributive
share of the $100 loss to meet the alternate test, the limited partner must agree to
a deficit restoration obligation of at least $50.
109. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(bX2XiiXd).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. In the example discussed in note 108, the limited partner (if she was
not required to agree to a $50 deficit restoration obligation initially because she did
not expect to receive the distribution in the earlier year) would be required to re-
ceive a $50 income allocation under the qualified income offset in the year the dis-
tribution of recourse debt proceeds brought her capital account to a deficit below any
limited obligation to restore. The qualified income offset should never be confused
with an obligation to restore a deficit capital account. The qualified income offset, if
triggered, will require the partner to report a distributive share of partnership in-
come without any corresponding right to receive a share of the partnerships wealth.
Because the qualified income offset uses income allocations to eliminate deficit capi-
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In addition to complying with the allocation rules under
§ 704(b), partners receiving distributive shares of losses must
have sufficient outside basis to absorb the loss in order to avoid
the loss being suspended." 3 Under § 752, partners receive an
increase to their individual outside basis for shares of the
partnership's liabilities."4 The regulations classify all partner-
ship liabilities as either recourse or nonrecourse. If any partner
or related person"5 bears the economic risk of loss associated
with the liability, the § 752 regulations deem that liability re-
course.1 6 Conversely, if no partner or related person bears the
economic risk of loss associated with the liability, then the § 752
regulations deem that liability nonrecourse."7 The partners'
shares of partnership recourse liabilities and the economic effect
safe harbor are integrally related. If a partner satisfies the eco-
nomic effect safe harbor by agreeing to an obligation to restore a
deficit capital account or a payment obligation or is legally re-
quired under state law to make payments or contributions on
behalf of the partnership, that partner will also bear the risk of
loss for the corresponding share of the partnership's recourse
liability. Consequently, very few distributive shares of losses
that in fact meet the economic effect safe harbor will be sus-
pended due to insufficient outside basis to absorb the loss."'
tal accounts that should be, but are not, covered by an obligation to restore, this
mechanism of the economic effect safe harbor conceptually resembles the minimum
gain chargeback which restores previous nonrecourse deductions with income alloca-
tions that do not carry a share of the partnership's wealth. See infra notes 170-79
and accompanying text.
113. I.R.C. § 704(d) (1994).
114. Treas. Reg. § 1.752 (as amended in 1991).
115. "Related person" is defined in Treas. Reg. § 1.752-4(b), -1(aX3).
116. Id. § 1.752-1(aXl).
117. Id.
118. See Hamill, Final Regulations, supra note 15, at 107-09. But see infra notes
203-09, 237, 238 (discussing the potential that a partner's illusory deficit restoration
obligation can support a distributive share of losses under the economic effect safe
harbor even though the § 752 constructive liquidation process will not increase the
partner's outside basis, because the deficit restoration obligation will never material-
ize, so the partner bears no economic risk of loss). In rare circumstances, especially
in partnerships with no liabilities, a distributive share of losses can meet the eco-
nomic effect safe harbor and still be suspended under § 704(d). For example, if a
partner receives a distributive share of losses that in fact corresponds to another
partner's capital, an obligation to restore a capital account will cause the allocation
to have economic effect, but will not support an outside basis increase until the
partner makes an actual contribution, therefore causing the loss to be suspended.
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To determine whether a partner (or related person) bears
the economic risk of loss, the § 752 regulations engage in an
entirely hypothetical constructive liquidation of the partner-
ship."9 The constructive liquidation treats the partnership's
assets (including cash) as having a value of zero.' The
partnership's liabilities become payable in full, 2 ' and the regula-
tions deem the partnership property as disposed of in a taxable
transaction.' Liabilities where payment is not limited to one
or more assets of the partnership (meaning the creditor or a
partner by virtue of possessing a positive capital account can
proceed against one or more partners) produce a taxable loss
equal to the basis of any property acquired with the debt pro-
ceeds or any available cash from the debt proceeds.' Finally,
the regulations hypothetically allocate the items of gain or loss
to the partners and liquidate the partnership.' 4 If, as a result
of the constructive liquidation, a partner (or related person)
would be required to make a payment or contribution to satisfy
the liability, the § 752 regulations deem that partner to bear the
economic risk of loss and receive the corresponding increase to
outside basis."2 For purposes of determining whether a part-
ner or related person bears the economic risk of loss for partner-
ship liabilities, the § 752 regulations consider obligations im-
posed by contract (such as guarantees or indemnifications), the
partnership agreement, or state law (which will include obliga-
tions to restore a deficit capital account resulting from the hypo-
thetical loss allocations generated by the constructive liquida-
tion).' As previously mentioned, a partner's share of the
partnership's recourse liabilities as determined by the construc-
119. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(bXlXv).
120. Id. § 1.752-2(bXlXii).
121. Id. § 1.752-2(bXlXi) (1991).
122. Id. § 1.752-2(bXlXiii).
123. Id. § 1.752-2(bX1Xiv). If payment on the liability is limited to the
partnership's assets (e.g., nonrecourse liabilities under § 1.1001-2 incurred by general
partnerships, limited partnerships, LLCs or LLPs as well as recourse liabilities un-
der § 1.1001-2 incurred by LLCs and LLPs), the constructive liquidation process
triggers gain to the extent the face of the liability exceeds the basis of the property
securing the liability.
124. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(bXl).
125. Id.
126. Id. § 1.752-2(bX3).
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tive liquidation process of the § 752 regulations also supplies the
necessary obligation to restore a deficit capital account in order
to satisfy the economic effect safe harbor.127
The second half of the regulations' test for determining
whether an allocation will be respected requires that the alloca-
tion be "substantial."" Unlike the economic effect safe harbor
which focuses on each individual partner enjoying the economic
benefits and bearing the economic burdens from the distributive
shares of partnership income and loss, the substantiality rules
use present value concepts and focus on the after-tax economic
consequences from the special allocations and the after-tax eco-
nomic consequences to the partners as a group. The rules are
designed to prevent the partners, as a group, from reducing
their overall tax liability with special allocations of partnership
income and loss that, in fact, carry little economic risk of alter-
ing the partners' intended economic arrangement. For alloca-
tions to be substantial, the regulations require special alloca-
tions to come with a reasonable possibility of affecting the dollar
amounts received by the partners. Unlike the mechanical "eco-
nomic effect" rules, which, if followed, provide an absolute safe
harbor insulating the allocations from attack by the Service, the
substantiality rules are more subjective and only provide taxpay-
ers with guidelines, leaving the Service with the ultimate discre-
tion to challenge the allocations.1"
Allocations deemed "insubstantial" are those that, despite
meeting the economic effect safe harbor, effectively reduce the
participant's overall tax liability with little if any economic risk
to the partners. The regulations paint two broad scenarios illus-
trating examples of insubstantial allocations: (1) transitory allo-
127. Id. § 1.752-2(bX3Xii)-(iii), -2(M, Example 1 (as amended in 1991); id. § 1.704-
l(bX2XiiXc) (as amended in 1997).
128. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(bX2XiiiXa). The general rules for testing allocations for
substantiality require that the after-tax economic consequences of at least one part-
ner be enhanced (in present value terms) as a result of the special allocation and a
strong likelihood exist that the after-tax economic consequences of no partner (in
present value terms) be substantially diminished as a result of the special allocation.
129. See id. The general rules testing allocations for substantiality under § 1.704-
l(bX2XiiiXa) provide the Service with enormous discretion to challenge allocations.
The language specifically states that even allocations which avoid being treated as
insubstantial under the transitory allocations or character shifting rules can still be
treated as insubstantial under the general language. Id.
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cations,13 and (2) character shifting allocations.13 ' Transitory
allocations occur when a partner receives a loss allocation which
is later offset by an income allocation, thereby allowing the part-
ner to take advantage of the time value of the money resulting
from the ability to save taxes from the use of early tax losses at
the price of more taxes from an income allocation in the future
restoring the earlier lOSS. 132 To avoid the Service reallocating
both the original and offsetting allocations, the partners must
show that at the time they agreed to both allocations, a substan-
tial risk existed that the offsetting allocation would never mate-
rialize, thus rendering permanent the capital account adjust-
ment from the original allocation."3
If little or no risk exists concerning the availability of future
income to offset the earlier special allocations of losses, the Ser-
vice can potentially invoke the transitory allocation rules and
reallocate the special allocations of losses and the offsetting in-
come.'3 However, even if little or no risk exists concerning the
availability of income to offset an earlier loss, the regulations
provide two situations in which allocations will be deemed "sub-
stantial" despite their transitory nature." If the source of the
later offsetting income allocation comes from the disposition of
the property that generated the original loss allocation, the
regulations conclusively assume that the income will never be
generated because of the regulations' presumption that the value
of all property equals and, therefore will never exceed, the basis
in the property.38 Moreover, if the partnership agreement re-
quires the partner to wait until the sixth year to offset the earli-
130. Id. § 1.704-1(bX2XiiiXc).
131. Id. § 1.704-1(bX2XiiiXb) (as amended in 1997).
132. Transitory allocations can also result when special allocations of income in
earlier years are later offset by loss allocations. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(bX2Xiii)(b).
133. Id. § 1.704-1(bX2XiiiXc).
134. See id. The same analysis applies if the original allocation of income is
largely offset with a later loss allocation. The transitory allocation rules require the
partners as a group to save taxes as a result of the original and offsetting alloca-
tions. Id. Consequently, if all the partners have an equal ability to take advantage
of the time value of money consideration and save taxes from an earlier distributive
share of losses that is offset by a later distributive share of income, the special
allocations cannot be deemed insubstantial because a reallocation among the partners
will not produce more tax liability when viewing the partners as a group.
135. Id. § 1.704-1(bX2XiiiXc).
136. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(bX2XiiiXcX2).
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er special allocation, the regulations presume that a sufficient
level of risk exists to render both allocations substantial. 7
Character shifting, on the other hand, occurs when the part-
ners take advantage of the unavoidable fact that taxable income
and losses of different characters can result in varying tax treat-
ment among the partners depending on their individual tax
situations." For example, capital gains historically have been
taxed at lower rates than ordinary income while tax-exempt
bond interest comes with no tax burden at all. Losses that repre-
sent above-the-line business expenses have a greater potential to
reduce tax liability than capital losses.3 9 Special allocations can
be reallocated on substantiality grounds if the partners use the
character distinctions and agree to special allocations that re-
duce the partners' total tax liability, while having little or no
affect on their economic consequences."4 For example, if the
partners agree to allocate all the ordinary income to the part-
ners with expiring net operating losses and all the capital gain
to the partners in the highest income tax bracket, and the eco-
nomic performance of both sources of income is steady and pre-
dictable, the Service can reallocate both special allocations.'"
B. The Rules Applicable to Allocations and Outside Bases
Adjustments Attributable to Nonrecourse Liabilities
The fundamental principles of the federal income tax system
treat proceeds derived from nonrecourse borrowings the same as
proceeds derived from recourse borrowings and proceeds gener-
137. Id. § 1.704-1(bX2XiiiXcX2).
138. Id. § 1.704-1(bX2XiiiXb).
139. See I.R.C. § 1(h) (complex formula establishing maximum capital gains rate
at a figure less than top income tax rate of 39.6% for individuals); id. § 103 (ex-
empting from tax interest on state or local bonds); id. § 162 (allowing a deduction
for all ordinary and necessary business expenses); id. § 1211 (establishing limitations
on the deductibility of capital losses).
140. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(bX2).
141. The character shifting rules require the partners as a group to save taxes
as a result of the shifting character allocations. Consequently, if, for example, the
partners agree to special allocations that shift tax items with different characters
amongst themselves but as a group do not save taxes, the special allocations cannot
be deemed insubstantial because a reallocation among the partners will not produce
more tax liability when viewing the partners as a group. Id. § 1.704-1(bX2Xiii).
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ated from after-tax dollars. On the theory that the borrower's
desire to keep the property that often secures nonrecourse debt
will motivate the borrower to pay off nonrecourse liabilities, de-
spite the absence of personal liability, proceeds from nonrecourse
borrowings can generate current deductions or provide basis in
property eligible for depreciation deductions. If the taxpayer
fails to pay off the nonrecourse loan, the requirement that the
entire unpaid balance be included in the amount realized en-
sures that any previous deductions supported by nonrecourse
debt are restored with taxable income carrying no possibility of
economic wealth, sometimes referred to as phantom income or
minimum gain.1
A partnership financed with capital from nonrecourse liabili-
ties can generate depreciation and other deductions through the
use of those proceeds that must be allocated to the individual
partners. Allocations of losses and deductions attributable to
nonrecourse debt incurred by the partnership' cannot have
"economic effect" because such losses never carry an economic
burden in that only the nonrecourse lender, rather than any of
the partners, will suffer an economic loss if the partnership fails
to pay back the liability. Moreover, the taxable income offsetting
previous nonrecourse deductions can never carry a correspond-
ing economic benefit.' The § 704(b) regulations define a non-
recourse liability as a debt for which no partner or related per-
son bears the economic risk of loss under the hypothetical con-
structive liquidation of the § 752 regulations. 4 ' State law
deems liabilities nonrecourse when some, or all, of the
borrower's assets are beyond the lender's reach in the event of
default.46 In a general or limited partnership, because the
142. See infra notes 144 and 150.
143. The most common example of an allocation attributable to nonrecourse liabil-
ities is depreciation deductions on property subject to nonrecourse liabilities.
144. Under the concepts of the Crane v. Commissioner and Tufts v. Commissioner
cases, allocations of income offsetting nonrecourse deductions are either "phantom
gain' or in fact produce real economic proceeds that actually pay off the nonrecourse
liability and therefore still cannot benefit any partner. See Crane v. Commissioner,
331 U.S. 1 (1947); Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983). For a detailed expla-
nation of the Crane and Tufts cases, see MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME
TAx 1 13.01, 13.04 (8th ed. 1999).
145. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(bX3) (1991). See supra text accompanying notes 122-24.
146. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2 (1980).
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partnership as borrower bears no personal liability for state law
nonrecourse debt, no partner will bear personal liability if the
partnership fails to pay off the nonrecourse liability.'47 Since
the lender, rather than the partners or related persons, bears
the potential economic burden that corresponds to these alloca-
tions, the allocations cannot have "substantial economic ef-
fect.""4 However, despite the lack of any economic burden, the
partners often enjoy great flexibility to allocate losses and de-
ductions attributable to nonrecourse debt in a number of differ-
ent ratios, so long as they comply with the § 704(b) regulations'
safe harbor that deems such allocations in accordance with the
partners' interests in the partnership.49
The nonrecourse debt rules employ the concept of "minimum
gain""5 and the presumption that the value of partnership
property equals its adjusted tax basis in order to measure the
existence of nonrecourse deductions at the partnership level and
determine the appropriate time to restore the previous nonre-
course deductions with income allocations. 5' Minimum gain
exists to the extent the face amount of a nonrecourse liability
exceeds the adjusted basis of property securing the debt.
152
147. See infra note 189 (discussing the different tax consequences to the borrower
based on whether the liability is recourse or nonrecourse); note 217 (discussing treat-
ment of recourse and nonrecourse liabilities incurred by general or limited partner-
ships); and text at p. 657 (discussing the tax consequences of general and limited
partnerships incurring nonrecourse debt as defined by § 1.1001-2).
148. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(bXl).
149. Id. § 1.704-2(eX2). See also infra notes 168 and 169 (discussing permissible
ratios for allocating nonrecourse deductions under the reasonable consistency require-
ment).
150. The concept of "minimum gain" can be traced to the case of Commissioner v.
Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983). At issue in Tufts was whether the amount realized from
the disposition of property subject to a nonrecourse liability includes such liability.
Tufts, 461 U.S. at 301. The Tax Court held that the nonrecourse liability must be
included in calculating the amount realized on the property's disposition even if the
amount of the mortgage exceeds the property's fair market value. Id. at 317. With-
out such a rule, partners who receive deductions attributable to property subject to
nonrecourse liabilities would be able to escape the tax burden associated with the
later disposition of the property. See id. Thus, when property's adjusted basis falls
below the face amount of a nonrecourse debt, minimum gain is created. See id.
151. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(bX2) (1991).
152. See id. The value-equals-basis presumption conclusively assumes that the
fair market value of the partnership's property, regardless of evidence to the con-
trary, equals its adjusted tax basis. Consequently, the property's basis represents the
maximum amount the partnership could receive from creditors if the property were
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Minimum gain grows wider as the difference between the
property's basis and the unpaid amount of the liability in-
creases.'" This event often occurs when property subject to a
nonrecourse liability depreciates at a rate faster than the part-
nership pays down the principal or when a partnership uses
property to secure a nonrecourse debt that exceeds the basis of
such property. The ironclad "value equals basis" presumption of
the regulations assumes that the property's basis represents the
maximum amount the lender could receive in a foreclosure sale,
even if solid evidence indicates that the property in fact has
more value.1" Minimum gain shrinks as the difference be-
tween the property's basis and the liability decreases, which
often occurs when the partnership repays a nonrecourse debt or
when a partnership disposes of property secured by a nonre-
course debt.'"
The regulations calculate the partnership's minimum gain
on a net basis.'" If a partnership incurs more than one nonre-
course liability, the regulations first calculate the increase or
decrease in minimum gain on each liability and then net the
figures together to compute an overall minimum gain increase or
decrease for the partnership's taxable year.57 As a result of
comparing the overall minimum gain for the current partnership
taxable year with the overall minimum gain for the immediately
preceding partnership taxable year, a partnership will either
show a net increase, a net decrease or no change in the overall
minimum gain.'" To the extent of the partnership's net in-
crease in minimum gain, existing partnership losses and deduc-
tions must be identified and labeled "nonrecourse deduc-
tions."'59 The regulations first treat depreciation or cost recov-
ery deductions of property subject to nonrecourse debt as nonre-
sold or otherwise transferred. See id. However, if the basis of property secured by a
nonrecourse liability equals or exceeds the amount of the nonrecourse debt, no mini-
mum gain exists because the value-equals-basis rule assumes that nonrecourse lia-
bility has adequate security. See id.
153. Id.
154. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(d).
155. Id. § 1.704-2(bX2).
156. Id. § 1.704-2(dXl).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(c) (1991).
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course deductions, and if such amount is insufficient to cover the
net increase in minimum gain, then a pro rata share of the
partnership's other losses and deductions are treated as nonre-
course deductions."e
The § 704(b) regulations' safe harbor for allocating distribu-
tive shares of nonrecourse deductions requires the following: (1)
the partnership agreement must comply with all requirements of
the "economic effect" safe harbor'6' (either with an unlimited
deficit restoration obligation 62 or via the alternate test with a
qualified income offset provision as well as a limited deficit
restoration obligation covering past loss allocations carrying eco-
nomic burdens'"'); (2) in the first taxable year in which there
are nonrecourse deductions through the remainder of the
partnership's term, the partnership agreement must provide for
allocations of nonrecourse deductions in a manner that is "rea-
sonably consistent" with other allocations that have substantial
economic effect of some other "significant" partnership item
attributable to the property securing the nonrecourse debt'6;
(3) in the first taxable year in which there are nonrecourse de-
ductions or distributions of nonrecourse debt proceeds, 16 the
partnership agreement must include a "minimum gain
chargeback" requirement;'6 and (4) all other material allocations
160. Id. § 1.704-2(j)()ii). If the amount of the nonrecourse losses and deductions
exceeds the partnership's losses and deductions, the excess partnership minimum
gain is carried over to the following partnership taxable year. Id. § 1.704-2(jXlXiii).
161. See id. § 1.704-1(bX2) (as amended in 1985).
162. See supra text accompanying note 100.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 109-12.
164. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(eX2).
165. Distributions of nonrecourse debt proceeds result when proceeds from a non-
recourse borrowing cause an increase in partnership miniumum gain and are distrib-
uted rather than being invested in partnership assets or used to meet partnership
expenditures. Id. § 1.704-2(c) and § 1.704-2(h).
166. Id. § 1.704-2(eX3) and § 1.704-2(f). The minimum gain chargeback require-
ment is subject to three exceptions. Id. § 1.704-2(f(2)-(4). First, if a conversion, refi-
nancing or other change to a nonrecourse debt causes the liability to become partial-
ly or wholly a recourse or a partner nonrecourse debt, a partner whose share of the
net decrease in minimum gain resulted from the conversion will not face the mini-
mum gain chargeback to the extent that the partner bears the economic risk of loss
for the newly converted liability. See id. § 1.704-2(f)(2). Second, if a partner contrib-
utes capital to the partnership to repay the nonrecourse liability or increase the
basis of the property subject to the nonrecourse liability, the contributing partner
will not face the minimum gain chargeback to the extent his share of the net de-
crease in the partnership minimum gain resulted from his capital contribution.
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and capital account adjustments must be respected by the Ser-
vice under § 1.704-1(b). 7
The "reasonably consistent" requirement governs the ratio
in which partners are entitled to allocate the distributive shares
of nonrecourse deductions. Distributive shares of nonrecourse
deductions satisfy the "reasonably consistent" requirement if the
partners' ratio for sharing nonrecourse deductions corresponds to
other "significant" allocations that have substantial economic
effect." While the regulations do not explicitly provide the
permissible allocation ratios, the regulatory examples indicate
that if the partner's shares of profit and loss differ, either the
profit or loss ratio or any ratio in between will satisfy the "rea-
sonably consistent" requirement.'69
The "minimum gain chargeback" requirement ensures that
partners who receive the benefit of earlier nonrecourse deduc-
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(f)(3). Third, the Commissioner has the power to waive theminimum gain chargeback requirement if a partner restored prior nonrecourse deduc-
tions with capital contributions or net income allocations before the partnership had
a net decrease in minimum gain; the minimum gain chargeback would distort the
partner's economic relationship; and finally the partnership will probably not have
sufficient income to correct the economic distortion. See id. § 1.704-2(f)(4).
167. Id. § 1.704-2(eX4).
168. Id. § 1.704-2(eX2).
169. Id. § 1.704-2(m), Examples 1 (i)-(iii). The examples involve two partners con-
tributing 10% and 90%, respectively, of the partnership's equity. The partnership
obtains a nonrecourse loan constituting 80% of the money needed to purchase the
partnership's only asset; that is, 20% of the value of the partnership's assets is
represented by amounts that could result in real economic losses to the partners.
The two partners share all losses 10%-90%, in accordance with their capital contri-
bution ratios, and all profits, after losses have been charged back, are split evenly.
The example states that nonrecourse deductions can be shared among the partners
10%-90%, 50%-50%, 25%-75%, or in any other ratio between the loss and profit ra-
tios. The example also indicates that allocations outside the parameters of the loss
and profit ratios (i.e., a 1%-99% ratio for sharing the nonrecourse deductions) will
not satisfy the reasonable consistency requirement. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(m),
Examples 1 (i)-(iii). The regulations clearly require the profit and loss ratios that
establish the boundaries of permissible nonrecourse deduction ratios to be significant
items. At some point, the percentage of the partnership's capital financed with equi-
ty or recourse liabilities becomes so small that the potential for real economic losses
becomes meaningless. The examples involve property that is financed with 20% equi-
ty capital and 80% nonrecourse debt, which suggests that 20% equity capital is
"significant"; however, it is unclear how much less equity capital would render the
loss ratio insignificant. See id. If the loss ratio cannot serve as a permissible bound-
ary establishing the shares of nonrecourse deductions, the partners must use the
profit ratio.
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tions bear the tax burden of such deductions. This chargeback is
accomplished by allocating income or gain allocations that come
with no corresponding economic rights to the partnership's cash
or other assets to the partners who received past distributive
shares of nonrecourse deductions or distributions of proceeds
attributable to nonrecourse liabilities. The regulations trigger
the minimum gain chargeback requirement when the
partnership experiences a net decrease in partnership minimum
gain during the year.70 The regulations use the partner's per-
centage share of the partnership's total minimum gain (which
reflects that partner's past allocations of nonrecourse deductions
and distributions of nonrecourse debt proceeds) to measure the
partner's share of the net decrease in partnership minimum
gain.'7' Thus, in the event of a net decrease in partnership mini-
mum gain, each partner who received previous allocations of
nonrecourse deductions or distributions of nonrecourse debt
proceeds must be allocated income and gain in an amount equal
to his share of the net decrease in partnership minimum
gain.
17 2
The most common events that cause partnership minimum
gain to decrease include dispositions of partnership property
subject to nonrecourse debt and payments on the principal of
nonrecourse liabilities. For example, if during the current year,
a partnership made a $150 principal payment on a $1000 nonre-
course liability secured by property with $800 adjusted ba-
sis, 73 the net decrease in partnership minimum gain for the
current year would be $150.171 If the partnership had two part-
ners each with a fifty percent share of the partnership's total
$200 minimum gain, their shares of the net decrease would be
170. Id. § 1.704-2(f) and § 1.704-2(d) (1991). Minimum gain decreases when the
spread between the face amount of all nonrecourse debts and the basis of all prop-
erty subject to the debts shrinks. See supra text accompanying notes 149-54.
171. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(gXl).
172. Id. § 1.704-2(f) and § 1.704-2(gX2).
173. This assumes that the partnership has no other assets secured by nonre-
course liabilities, and the asset's basis did not change.
174. The partnership's minimum gain on the last day of the preceding year was
$200 (the difference between the $1000 liability and the asset's $800 basis). At the
end of the current year, the partnership's minimum gain was $50 (the difference
between the $850 liability after the principal payment and the asset's $800 basis),
resulting in a $150 net decrease.
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$75 each.175 At the end of the current taxable year, the
partnership's total minimum gain would be $50, and each
partner's share (and future minimum gain chargeback potential)
would be $25.
Under the minimum gain chargeback requirement, existing
partnership income and gain must be allocated to the partners
to the extent of their share of the net decrease in partnership
minimum gain during the year.7 6  The minimum gain
chargeback first consists of gains realized from the disposition of
partnership property subject to nonrecourse liabilities. If
such gains are insufficient, the regulations use a pro rata share
of the partnership's other items of income and gain to satisfy the
minimum gain chargeback. 78 If the minimum gain chargeback
exceeds the partnership's income and gains for the taxable year,
the excess carries over to succeeding years until the partnership
has sufficient income to satisfy the chargeback.
179
Partners who receive distributive shares of partnership
losses properly labeled as nonrecourse deductions must have
sufficient outside basis to absorb the loss in order to avoid hav-
ing § 704(d) suspend the loss. The regulations under § 752 direct
that partners receiving distributive shares of nonrecourse deduc-
tions under the safe harbor receive corresponding increases to
their outside bases for shares of partnership nonrecourse liabili-
ties. The priority rules for increasing outside bases for shares of
the partnership's nonrecourse liabilities have three levels. First,
the partnership liabilities are allocated to the partners to reflect
their shares of partnership minimum gain under § 1.704-2."8
Second, nonrecourse liabilities are allocated to reflect the tax-
able gain that would be allocated to the partners under § 704(c)
or § 1.704-1(b)(4)(i) if the partnership disposed of all its property
subject to nonrecourse liabilities for no consideration other than
relief of those liabilities.'8' Finally, any remaining nonrecourse
liabilities are then allocated in accordance with the partners'
175. Each has a 50% share of the $150 net decrease ($75 each).
176. Treas. Reg. §1.704-2(fXl) (1991).
177. Id § 1.704-2(f)(6), (jX2).
178. Id.
179. Id. § 1.704-2(f)(6) and § 1.704-2(jX2Xiii).
180. Id. § 1.752-3(aX1).
181. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3(aX2) (1991). See supra note 15.
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shares of the partnership's profits or in the manner the partners
reasonably expect to allocate future nonrecourse deductions."
The partners' profit-sharing arrangement, specified in the part-
nership agreement, will be respected so long as it is consistent
with other significant allocations that have substantial economic
effect. "
C. Separate Safe Harbor for Allocations Attributable to
Partner Nonrecourse Liabilities
The § 704(b) regulations contain a third set of rules govern-
ing allocations attributable to partner nonrecourse liabilities.
These provisions, often referred to as the partner nonrecourse
debt rules, set up a safe harbor governing allocations of losses
and deductions attributable to nonrecourse liabilities where,
despite the nonrecourse status of the debt to the partnership as
the borrower, a partner or related person" bears the economic
risk of loss under the § 752 regulations. The partner nonre-
course debt rules do not treat a partner's economic risk of loss,
with respect to a partnership nonrecourse liability, as an obliga-
tion to restore a deficit capital account under the economic effect
safe harbor. Rather, the partner nonrecourse debt rules set up a
parallel regime similar to the safe harbor applicable to alloca-
tions attributable to nonrecourse liabilities in order to ensure
that the appropriate amount of losses attributable to the partner
nonrecourse debt are allocated to the partner who bears the
economic risk of loss." First, the safe harbor identifies nonre-
course liabilities where a partner nevertheless bears the econom-
ic risk of loss; then the rules require minimum gain calculations,
with respect to that individual debt. The minimum gain calcula-
tions focus on the particular partner nonrecourse liability and
measure the extent the partner nonrecourse deductions must be
segregated and allocated to the partner bearing the correspond-
ing risk of loss."
182. Id. § 1.752-3(aX3).
183. Id.
184. "Related person" is defined in Treas. Reg. § 1.752-4(b), -2(bX4) (1991).
185. Id. § 1.704-2(i) (1991).
186. Id. See also infra text accompanying notes 205-07 (illustrating how the part-
ner nonrecourse debt rules prevent the partners from allocating losses inappropriate-
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The regulations classify a debt as a partner nonrecourse
liability to the extent it meets the definition of nonrecourse
under § 1.1001-2 and a partner (or related person) bears the
economic risk of loss under the § 752 regulations. ls The regu-
lations under § 1.1001-2 differentiate between recourse and non-
recourse liabilities based on the lender's rights against the bor-
rower upon default. If the lender can pursue only certain assets
of the borrower, or stated another way, the lender cannot pursue
all the borrower's assets, the liability meets the definition of
nonrecourse as contemplated by § 1 .1001-2.se If all the borrow-
er's assets can be pursued by the lender to pay the debt, thereby
rendering the borrower personally liable, the debt meets the
definition of recourse under state law as contemplated by
§ 1.1001-2.1s 9 Only liabilities where state law treats the part-
nership as the borrower as having no personal liability can meet
the definition of partner nonrecourse debt.
The second half of the partner nonrecourse debt definition
looks to the § 752 regulations to determine if a partner bears the
economic risk of loss for the liability despite the liability's nonre-
course status to the partnership as the borrower."9 The most
common examples of partner nonrecourse debt include a partner
making a nonrecourse loan to the partnership and a partner
ly to partners who bear no economic burden because their deficit restoration obliga-
tions will never materialize and are therefore illusory).
187. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(bX4).
188. Id. § 1.1001-2 (1980).
189. Id. Under § 1.1001-2, with dispositions of property subject to a nonrecourse
liability, the transferor's amount realized includes the unpaid portion of the nonre-
course liability regardless of the property's fair market value. Id. § 1.1001-2(aX4Xi), -
2(b); see also Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983) (entire unpaid balance of a
nonrecourse liability must be included in the amount realized when the property
subject to the debt is disposed of, even if the unpaid nonrecourse mortgage exceeds
the property's fair market value; under the facts a general partnership incurred a
nonrecourse liability and disposed of the underlying property after the property's
value had fallen below the face of the debt). However if the property disposed of is
subject to a recourse liability, the amount realized on the disposition of the property
includes the liability only to the extent another person agrees to pay the liability.
Tress. Reg. § 1.1001-2(aX4Xii). If the property subject to a recourse liability is dis-
posed of and only part of the recourse liability is paid off (i.e., the property's value
falls below the face of the recourse liability, and the lender does not proceed against
the borrower's personal assets because the borrower has no assets), then the unpaid
portion of the recourse liability is treated as cancellation of indebtedness income. See
id. § 1.1001-2(aX2).
190. Id. §§ 1.704-2(bX4), 1.752-2 (1991).
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guaranteeing a nonrecourse loan made to the partnership by a
third party. 9 ' The § 752 regulations contain a special rule out-
side the constructive liquidation process that deems partner
nonrecourse lenders as bearing the economic risk of loss for the
loan while the hypothetical constructive liquidation process rec-
ognizes guarantees of the partnership's third party nonrecourse
debt as payment obligations."
The mechanics of the partner nonrecourse debt rules strong-
ly resemble the rules for allocations attributable to nonrecourse
liabilities, except that the regulations calculate the minimum
gain increases and decreases individually with respect to each
partnership nonrecourse liability where a partner bears the
economic risk of loss. 9' The minimum gain calculations, with
respect to each partner nonrecourse liability, ensure that the
partner who bears the economic risk of loss not only receives the
outside basis increase for the liability but also the distributive
shares of partnership losses and income attributable to the lia-
bility. Similar to the rules governing allocations attributable to
nonrecourse liabilities, if the individual partner nonrecourse
liability shows a net increase in minimum gain (because, for
example, depreciation on property securing the liability falls
below the face of the liability), the partner who bears the eco-
nomic risk of loss must be allocated partner nonrecourse deduc-
tions in an amount equal to the net increase minimum gain."
The partner nonrecourse deductions must first come from depre-
ciation or cost recovery deductions on property subject to the
partner nonrecourse debt, and if such amount fails to cover the
minimum gain increase, a pro rata share of the partnership's
other losses and deductions. If the amount of partner nonre-
course deductions exceeds the partnership's losses and deduc-
tions for the taxable year, the excess carries over to succeeding
191. See id. § 1.704-2, 56 Fed. Reg. 66,978 (1991) (preamble to the regulations).
192. See id. § 1.752-2(c)(1) (noting that a partner making a nonrecourse loan to
the partnership is deemed to bear the economic risk of loss unless another partner
bears the economic risk of loss); id. § 1.752-2(bX3Xi) (specifically referring to
guarantees by partners of partnership liabilities where the rights run directly to the
creditor as obligations to be factored into the constructive liquidation process). See
infra text accompanying notes 210-11 for examples of non-lending partners bearing
the economic risk for partner nonrecourse loans.
193. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(i).
194. Id. § 1.704-2(iX2).
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years until the partnership has sufficient losses and deduc-
tions.
195
Similar to the rules governing allocations attributable to
nonrecourse liabilities, the partner nonrecourse debt rules con-
tain a minimum gain chargeback requirement. If the minimum
gain on the individual partner nonrecourse debt decreases (be-
cause, for example, the partnership disposes of the property
subject to the liability or pays off the liability), the partner who
received previous allocations of any partner nonrecourse deduc-
tions must be allocated income and gain equal to the amount of
the net decrease in partner nonrecourse debt minimum gain.'
The partner nonrecourse debt minimum gain chargeback first
consists of gains realized from the disposition of partnership
property subject to the particular partner nonrecourse liability.
If such gains are insufficient, the regulations use a pro rata
share of the partnership's other items of income and gain to
satisfy the minimum gain chargeback. If the minimum gain
chargeback exceeds the partnership's income and gains for the
taxable year, the excess carries over to succeeding years until
the partnership has sufficient income.197
The existence of a third set of rules that require allocations
attributable to partner nonrecourse debt to follow a safe harbor
parallel to the nonrecourse allocation rules adds enormous com-
plexity to the § 704(b) regulations. The existence of the partner
nonrecourse debt rules essentially divides losses and income
that in the ordinary sense carry economic consequences to at
least one partner" into two allocation regimes, the substantial
195. Id. § 1.704-2(jXlXi) & -2(jXIXiii) (1991).
196. Id. § 1.704-2(iX4).
197. Id. § 1.704-2(jX2Xii) and -2(jX2Xiii).
198. Partners who bear the economic risk of loss for liabilities that are recourse
to the partnership (and therefore are treated as having a deficit restoration obliga-
tion under the economic effect safe harbor, and if the partnership fails to pay back
the recourse debt the obligation to restore can be invoked to satisfy the recourse
debt) substantively resemble partners who make nonrecourse loans to the partner-
ship or guarantee the partnership's third party nonrecourse debt. Like the circum-
stances where a partner bears the economic burden for a share of recourse debt, the
taxable losses resulting from depreciation or business expenses generated from part-
ner nonrecourse debt can only be borne by the lender or guarantor. If the partner-
ship fails to earn sufficient funds to pay back the partner nonrecourse liability, the
lender will not be paid back, or the guarantor will be forced to pay the liability if
the partnership fails to earn sufficient funds to pay off the liability. Moreover, if the
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economic effect rules and the partner nonrecourse debt rules,
each of which operates from a different conceptual framework.
When analyzing distributive shares of partnership losses, the
economic effect safe harbor focuses on the proper debit of the
partner's capital account and the existence of an appropriate
obligation to restore a deficit capital account. Under the econom-
ic effect safe harbor, a partner's capital account serves as the
sole barometer to account for the partner's share of partnership
losses.' Because the distributive shares of losses that have
economic effect either reduce the partners' shares of the
partnership's assets or create a potential obligation to restore a
deficit capital account, the partners normally will insist on com-
panion special allocations of income restoring the previous spe-
cial allocations of losses. The substantiality rules empower the
Service to scrutinize and possibly reallocate both sets of special
allocations.'
The partner nonrecourse debt safe harbor operates under
the same principles, based on minimum gain, as the rules gov-
erning allocations attributable to nonrecourse liabilities. Since a
partner bears the economic risk of loss, the safe harbor focuses
on the individual liability to ensure that the proper partner
receives the appropriate amount of the distributive shares of
losses. The rules first measure the existence of partner nonre-
course deductions by calculating minimum gain increases. Then
the rules label existing losses as partner nonrecourse deductions
and require that the allocations of the partner nonrecourse de-
ductions be made to the partner who bears the economic risk of
loss for the partnership's nonrecourse liability. Finally, the rules
require those losses to be restored at the appropriate time
through the minimum gain chargeback requirement.21 The
partner nonrecourse debt rules cover existing losses and deduc-
partnership earns sufficient income to pay back the partner nonrecourse liability, the
lender or guarantor benefits economically from the distributive share of income in a
similar manner as partners bearing the risk of loss for shares of recourse debt, be-
cause in each situation the partners avoid suffering an economic loss by having to
make actual payments (or failing to be paid back in the case of the partner nonre-
course lender).
199. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(bX2XiiXb) and § 1.704-1(bX2XiiXa) (as amended in
1997).
200. Id. § 1.704-1(bX2Xiii). See supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
201. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(i) (1991).
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tions whenever the spread between the basis of property secur-
ing the liability and the liability's face amount increases regard-
less of whether the partners' capital accounts show a deficit.
Moreover, the partner nonrecourse debt rules do not require an
obligation to restore a deficit capital account because the mini-
mum gain chargeback requirement always restores the partner
nonrecourse deductions. Unlike the substantiality rules that
scrutinize income allocations offsetting previous special alloca-
tions of losses with economic effect, the minimum gain
chargeback in the partner nonrecourse debt rules requires the
income allocations to restore the previous partner nonrecourse
deductions.
The regulations created a separate allocation regime paral-
lel to the nonrecourse allocation rules for partner nonrecourse
debt in order to ensure that the partnership allocates the proper
amount of losses to the appropriate partner. Under the current
structure of the § 704(b) regulations, the partner nonrecourse
debt rules measure the amount of losses in the hands of the
partnership potentially borne by a partner for genuine nonre-
course debt. The § 704(b) regulations need to contain a mecha-
nism that measures this loss potential because of the difference
under state law in the economic consequences at the partnership
level from defaulting on recourse and nonrecourse debt. Because
state law holds the partnership, as the borrower, personally
liable for recourse debt, the potential for real economic loss at
the partner level can be measured by the economic effect safe
harbor's focus on the capital accounts of the partners. The capi-
tal accounts reflect the aggregate of the partnership's assets, all
of which are available to the creditor to satisfy the partnership
recourse debt.
However, in the case of genuine nonrecourse debt at the
partnership level, only the assets identified in the loan agree-
ment as security for the debt are available to the creditor if the
partnership defaults. Consequently the potential for real eco-
nomic loss at the partner level can be measured only by refer-
ring to the difference between the basis of these assets and the
face amount of the partnership's nonrecourse liability. For exam-
ple, if a partner makes a nonrecourse loan (or guarantees the
partnership's third party nonrecourse debt) to the partnership,
secured only by nondepreciable raw land, none of the
649
Alabama Law Review
partnership's losses can be attributed to that debt as long as the
land's basis equals the face of the liability. Consequently, dis-
tributive shares of losses to the lending or guaranteeing partner
creating a deficit capital account cannot have economic effect
without an independent obligation to restore a deficit capital
account. In other words, the partner's risk of loss for this nonre-
course liability of the partnership cannot be substituted for an
independent deficit restoration obligation, because under the
value-equals-basis rule, no loss has occurred to the partnership
as the borrower with respect to the nonrecourse debt secured by
the nondepreciable raw land. Since the current structure of the
economic effect safe harbor contains no mechanism to measure
the loss potential from the partnership's nonrecourse debt, the §
704(b) regulations need to include the third allocation regime
embodied in the partner nonrecourse debt rules. By measuring
the existence of partner nonrecourse deductions through a net
increase in minimum gain calculation with respect to the partic-
ular liability and the particular assets securing the liability, the
mechanics of the partner nonrecourse debt rules properly mea-
sure the amount of real economic loss potentially borne by the
partner.'
The partner nonrecourse debt rules also prevent partners
from receiving loss allocations under the economic effect safe
harbor supported by illusory rather than real deficit restoration
obligations. Under the economic effect safe harbor, partners can
receive distributive shares of taxable losses as long as the capi-
tal accounts are properly maintained and debited, and the part-
ner covers any deficit capital account resulting from the dis-
tributive share with an obligation to restore the deficit at liqui-
dation. Pursuant to the economic effect safe harbor, the obliga-
tion to restore a deficit capital account will only materialize if
the deficit capital account still remains after all income and gain
allocations triggered during the liquidation are accounted for
202. Professor Hamill credits Lisa Moss for identifying and articulating, in a well
written exam answer, the need for a mechanism to measure the existence of real
losses at the partnership level attributable to the nonrecourse liability in order to
allocate the appropriate amount of losses to the partner bearing the economic risk of
loss. Ms. Moss also recognized the inability of the current economic effect rules to
measure these losses because of the focus on all of the partnership's assets in the
aggregate as reflected in the partners' capital accounts in the aggregate.
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with capital account increases.' However, when defining what
constitutes a valid obligation to restore a deficit capital account
for purposes of supporting a distributive share of taxable losses
in a particular taxable year, the economic effect safe harbor uses
examples tautologically by merely referring to promissory notes
made by the partner as well as obligations imposed by state or
local law without further elaboration or definition. Moreover, the
definition of a valid obligation to restore only focuses on the
contractual deficit restoration obligations the partner agrees to
during the taxable year the deficit restoration obligation exists
rather than concentrating on the actual effect of the deficit res-
toration obligation upon liquidation of the partnership.' If a
partner agrees to a contractually enforceable deficit restoration
obligation in a particular taxable year, that agreement arguably
meets the definition of a valid deficit restoration obligation
which can support a distributive share of taxable losses even if
the deficit restoration obligation will never materialize due to
the existence of income and gain that will eliminate the deficit
capital account during the partnership's liquidation, rendering
the obligation to restore illusory.
Two simple examples best Mustrate how the partner nonre-
course debt rules prevent Musory deficit restoration obligations
203. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(bX2XivXb) (partners' capital accounts must be increased
for allocations of income and gain); id. § 1.704-1(bX2XiiXbX2)-(3), -(dX2)
(Distributive shares of partnership losses creating a deficit capital account
must be covered by either a unlimited or limited obligation to restore the
deficit capital account upon liquidation of the partnership; if a partner has a
deficit capital account following liquidation of the partnership, taking into
account all capital account adjustments during such year the liquidation oc-
curs, the partner must make contributions restoring the amount of the deficit).
(emphasis added).
204. Id. § 1.704-1(bX2XiiXc)
(If a partner is not expressly obligated to restore the deficit balance in his
capital account, such partner nevertheless will be treated as obligated to re-
store the deficit balance in his capital account... to the extent of (1) The
outstanding principal balance of any promissory note (of which such partner is
the maker) contributed to the partnership... and (2) The amount of any
unconditional obligation of such partner (whether imposed by the partnership
agreement or by State or local law) to make subsequent contributions to the
partnership . . .).
Id. § 1.704-1(bX2XiiXbX3) (obligation to restore a deficit capital account materializes




from supporting allocations of distributive shares of taxable
losses. Partners making nonrecourse loans to a partnership will
never receive a capital account credit if the loan qualifies as
debt rather than equity.' ° Similarly if the business arrange-
ment between the partners fails to treat payment on a guaran-
tee of a partnership nonrecourse liability as a deemed equity
contribution, like the partner nonrecourse lender, the guarantor
will never receive a capital account credit. Because no capital ac-
count credit results from the loan or the payment on the guaran-
tee, the lending or guaranteeing partner has no means to en-
force a deficit restoration obligation agreed to by another part-
ner.2° Because the § 752 regulations treat payment of these
liabilities as limited to the partnership's assets, the constructive
liquidation process triggers gain to the extent the unpaid portion
of the liability exceeds the basis of the partnership's assets sub-
ject to the liability. This gain eliminates the illusory deficit res-
toration obligation agreed to by the nonlending or
nonguaranteeing partner, resulting in the outside basis increase
being apportioned to the lending or guaranteeing partner.'
Because the definition of partner nonrecourse debt directly
uses § 752's constructive liquidation process to define which
partner must receive the partner nonrecourse deductions, illuso-
ry deficit rstoration obligations cannot be used to inappropriate-
ly shift distributive shares of losses away from the lending or
guaranteeing partner. If the economic effect safe harbor applied
to distributive shares of taxable losses that are now covered by
the partner nonrecourse debt rules, an illusory deficit restora-
tion obligation could arguably allow a partner, other than the
lender or guarantor, to receive the losses on the strength of an
illusory deficit restoration obligation.' The partner nonre-
205. See I.R.C. § 385 (1994).
206. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 10-8A-807(b) (1999) (providing in the settling of ac-
counts that the partnership is only required to make distributions to the extent a
partner has credits in his capital account).
207. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(bX2Xi) (1991) (During constructive liquidation, if
payment on the liability is limited solely to one or more assets of the partnership,
then gain or loss is triggered equal to the difference between the amount of the lia-
bility extinguished and the basis of the property; therefore if the unpaid liability
exceeds the basis of the property, then gain will be recognized during the construc-
tive liquidation.); see also Hamill, Final Regulations, supra note 15, at 120-21.
208. Because the constructive liquidation process of the § 752 regulations always
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course debt rules ensure that the distributive shares of the
partnership's losses end up with the appropriate partner who
bears the economic risk of loss, the partner who receives the
outside basis increase under the § 752 regulations.'
The partner nonrecourse debt rules cover many situations
where the threat of illusory deficit restoration obligations sup-
porting distributive shares of taxable losses does not exist. For
example, if the partners' business arrangement treats payments
on a guarantee of a partnership nonrecourse liability as a
deemed equity contribution, the guarantor will receive a capital
account credit (upon payment on the guarantee) that provides
an effective means to enforce the deficit restoration obligation of
another partner. Moreover, in the context of all partner nonre-
course loans and all guarantees made by partners on partner-
ship nonrecourse debt (whether or not payment on the guaran-
tee increases the guarantor's capital account), if another partner
agrees to an absolute payment or reimbursement obligation that
materializes upon default of the loan, without regard to the
existence of a deficit capital account, such obligation will be en-
forceable by the lending or guaranteeing partner. Because the §
752 regulations treat payment of these liabilities as not limited
to the assets of the partnership, 10 the constructive liquidation
process triggers a loss equal to the basis of any partnership
assets available to satisfy the liability, and the outside basis
increase follows how the partners bear the economic risk of loss.
prevents illusory deficit restoration obligations from resulting in outside basis in-
creases, the § 704(d) suspension rules could also operate as a backstop to prevent
distributive shares of losses from being deducted by partners who in fact bear no
economic burden for the losses. However, if the partner agreeing to the illusory
deficit restoration had sufficient outside basis from other sources and the partner
nonrecourse debt rules did not exist, the economic effect safe harbor could be used
to gain the timing benefit of allocating currently deductible losses that in substance
carry no economic burden. If the partner nonrecourse debt rules did not exist the
Service could still try to disallow distributive shares of taxable losses supported by
illusory deficit restoration obligations based on general substance over form princi-
ples and the broad anti-abuse rule of § 1.701-2. However, the substance over form
and anti-abuse arguments would require the Service to find and audit loss alloca-
tions supported by illusory deficit restoration obligations. Because the partner nonre-
course debt rules effectively deny taxpayers a reporting position, they do a much
better job stopping distributive shares of losses based on illusory deficit restoration
obligations.
209. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(bX4), -2(i) (1991).
210. See Hamill, Final Regulations, supra note 15, at 120-21.
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Because the liability literally falls within the definition of part-
ner nonrecourse debt-nonrecourse to the partnership under
§ 1.1001-2 with at least one partner bearing the economic risk of
loss-the partner nonrecourse debt rules apply. The risk of loss
ratio established by the § 752 regulations creates two or more
separate partner nonrecourse liabilities and requires separate
minimum gain calculations for each liability."
Including within the partner nonrecourse debt rules situa-
tions where the threat of illusory deficit restoration obligations
supporting distributive shares of taxable losses does not exist
greatly increases the complexity of the partner nonrecourse debt
rules by requiring multiple partner nonrecourse debt minimum
gain calculations with respect to one liability in the commercial
sense. If a non-lending or non-guaranteeing partner truly bears
the economic risk of loss for a partnership nonrecourse liability
lent or guaranteed by another partner, no abuse potential
through the use of illusory deficit restoration obligations exists.
Consequently, the substantial economic effect rules could apply
to absolute payment obligations and real deficit restoration obli-
gations agreed to by non-lending and non-guaranteeing partners.
The definition of partner nonrecourse debt in § 1.704-2(b)(4)
could be amended to exclude partner nonrecourse liabilities
created by the splitting of a partner nonrecourse loan or guaran-
tee of a partnership nonrecourse debt caused by another partner
bearing the risk of loss through a absolute payment obligation or
a real deficit restoration obligation.212 This would leave the por-
tion of the partner nonrecourse liability allocated under the
§ 752 regulations to the original lender or guarantor within the
211. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.752-2, 1.704-2(bX4), -2(i) (1991).
212. The language modifying the definition of partner nonrecourse debt in
§ 1.704-2(bX4) could be as follows:
Partner nonrecourse debt does not include debts for which the partner making
or guaranteeing the debt to the partnership has a contractual right to be re-
stored (partially or wholly) by a second partner if that payment obligation re-
sults in the second partner bearing some or all of the economic risk of loss
under § 1.752-2(b) because either the guaranteeing partner receives an in-
creased capital account upon payment of the guarantee, or the subsequent
payment obligation by the second partner is not dependent on him or her
having a deficit capital account.
Professor Hamill credits Robert Plott for coming up with this language in a well
written exam answer.
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partner nonrecourse debt rules. The portion of the partner non-
recourse liability split off and allocated to a non-lending or non-
guaranteeing partner, which under current rules requires sepa-
rate minimum gain calculations, would be available to support a
deficit capital account under the substantial economic effect
rules.
However, amending the definition of partner nonrecourse
debt, in order to avoid creating multiple partner nonrecourse
liabilities when no possibility exists that an illusory deficit resto-
ration obligation will support a loss, raises at least two prob-
lems. First, the amendment will not always clearly identify
which portion of the partner nonrecourse liability properly be-
longs to the original lender or guarantor, for example, in cases
involving cross guarantees. 13 Moreover, the proposed amend-
ment contains no mechanism to measure the amount of real
losses at the partnership level with respect to the portion of the
nonrecourse liability removed from the partner nonrecourse debt
rules and sent over to the substantial economic effect rules.
Because the portion of the nonrecourse liability moved to the
economic effect rules can only produce a real economic loss at
the partnership level to the extent that the basis of the contrac-
tually identified assets securing the loan exceeds the face
amount of the liability, and the economic effect rules use the
partners' capital accounts to measure real losses with respect to
all partnership assets in the aggregate, the proposed amend-
ment by itself cannot properly measure how much real loss po-
tential exists for allocation purposes.214
213. Professor Hamill credits Thad Davis for pointing out the problem of deter-
mining which partner is the original guarantor in the context of the proposed
amendment to the definition of partner nonrecourse debt in a well written exam
answer.
214. Professor Hamill credits Lisa Moss for pointing out the problem of properly
measuring how much real loss potential exists for allocation purposes in the context




IV. THE APPLICATION OF THE § 704(b) REGULATIONS TO
DIFFERENT BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS AND UNIQUE ISSUES
POSED BY LLCs AND LLPs
A. Allocation Rules in the Context of Different
Business Organizations
The type of business organization chosen by the participants
under state law sometimes affects the analysis of both the
§ 704(b) regulations governing distributive shares of partnership
income and loss and the § 752 regulations governing outside
basis increases for shares of partnership liabilities. The exis-
tence or absence of limited liability protection under state law
for the partners or members constitutes the most important
state law characteristic that can affect the allocation and liabili-
ty sharing rules. The four most common state law unincorporat-
ed business organization choices-the general partnership, limit-
ed partnership, limited liability company and limited liability
partnership-are often identified by the presence or absence of
limited liability protection.215 Under state law all partners of a
general partnership bear personal liability for all recourse debts
of the partnership.21 State law only exposes the general part-
ners of limited partnerships to personal liability for the
partnership's recourse debts, while providing limited partners
with the same limited liability protection enjoyed by sharehold-
ers of corporations.217 LLCs and LLPs, the newest unincorpo-
rated business organizations available, provide all members and
partners with the same limited liability protection enjoyed by
corporate shareholders."8
In many circumstances, the type of business organization
chosen by the participants will not affect the analysis of the dis-
tributive shares. Regardless of whether the participants choose a
general partnership, limited partnership, LLC or LLP, the dis-
215. See sources cited at supra notes 1-5; see also supra note * (citing other
three articles of the Alabama Law Review series that discuss other distinguishing
business characteristics among these four business organization forms).
216. ALA. CODE § 10-8A-306(a) (1999).
217. Id. § 10-9B-303, 403.
218. Id. §§ 10-12-20(a), 10-8A-306(c).
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tributive shares of losses, typically representing the initial start-
up costs of the business, attributable to the partners' shares of
equity capital219 will be respected as long as the partners prop-
erly debit the capital accounts, liquidate according to positive
capital accounts and avoid violating the substantiality rules.
Similarly, regardless of whether the participants choose a gener-
al partnership, limited partnership, LLC or LLP, distributive
shares of income that either restore previous losses attributable
to equity capital or represent bona fide profit (income exceeding
amounts restoring all initial capital of the partnership) will be
respected as long as the partners properly credit the capital
accounts, liquidate according to positive capital accounts and
avoid violating the substantiality rules. ° Income allocations
restoring previous losses related to equity contributions subject
219. Regardless of whether the participants operate as a general partnership,
limited partnership, LLC or LLP the partners or members normally will agree to a
loss sharing ratio that charges their shares of equity capital in a proportional fash-
ion (allowing no losses to create a deficit capital account while other capital accounts
are still positive). In the context of general partnerships, if the partners fail to agree
to a specific loss ratio, the default ratio for sharing losses follows the partners' profit
ratio. The default profit sharing ratio can create a deficit capital account for some
partners (especially those contributing services rather than equity capital) while
other partners' capital accounts remain positive. For general partnerships, state law
automatically requires the partner with a deficit capital account to make contribu-
tions to satisfy the other partner's positive capital account. See ALA. CODE § 10-8A-
401 & cmt. 3 (1999), discussed in Stover & Hamill, supra note *, at 836 n.100. In
the context of LLCs and LLPs if the members or partners fail to agree on a loss
sharing ratio, the default provisions ensure that no member or partner receives loss-
es creating a deficit capital account while other members or partners still show a
positive capital account. See ALA. CODE § 10-12-28 (1999) and RUPA § 401(b), dis-
cussed in Stover & Hamill, supra note *, at 835-38. Consequently, with LLCs and
LLPs (as well as limited partners of limited partnerships), the members or partners
have to affirmatively agree to an obligation to restore a deficit capital account in
order to be forced to make contributions.
Because of the automatic unlimited deficit restoration obligation imposed by
state law, general partnerships can meet the economic effect safe harbor without
complying with the alternate test. For limited partnerships, LLCs and LLPs, the
operating agreement must contain a qualified income offset in order to meet the safe
harbor for establishing economic effect under the alternate test even if no deficit
capital accounts exist or are contemplated in the future. The qualified income offset
serves as a backstop providing mandatory income allocations in the event that fu-
tare loss allocations bring a partner's capital account below the amount that is cov-
ered by a limited obligation to restore a deficit capital account or will be restored by
the minimum gain chargeback. See also supra notes 94-103 and infra notes 223-30.
220. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(bX2Xii) and Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(bX2Xiii) (as amended
in 1997).
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both the previous losses and offsetting income to scrutiny as
possible transitory allocations. These earlier loss allocations also
face scrutiny under the portion of the substantiality rules deal-
ing with shifting different characters of income or losses among
the partners."2 Income allocations representing true profit will
generally pose no substantiality problems as long as the part-
ners avoid character shifting allocations. As long as each
partner's distributive share of the different characters of income
follows the overall profit ratio, the allocation should pose no sub-
stantiality issues due to shifting allocations.'
The rules for allocating distributive shares of losses and
income attributable to liabilities meeting the definition of nonre-
course under § 1.1001-2 (the entity as the borrower is not per-
sonally liable) apply in the same manner regardless of whether
a general partnership, limited partnership, LLC or LLP incurred
the liability. The nonrecourse debt allocation rules calculate
minimum gain increases and decreases, and the safe harbor for
allocating nonrecourse deductions and minimum gain
chargebacks remains unaffected by the type of entity chosen. If
the debt is truly nonrecourse to the entity, the assets available
to satisfy the loan (which provide the backbone of the minimum
gain calculations in the regulations governing allocations attrib-
utable to nonrecourse liabilities) will be determined by the con-
tractual agreement between the lender and the entity and will
not be affected by the presence or absence of limited liability
protection to the participants. Moreover, if one or more of the
partners or members bear the economic risk of loss for a nonre-
course liability (as defined by § 1.1001-2) of a general partner-
ship, limited partnership, LLC or LLP, the partner nonrecourse
debt allocation rules apply in the same manner regardless of the
type of entity that incurred the liability. The contractual ar-
rangements, rather than the presence or absence of limited
221. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(bX2Xiii). See supra notes 132-37 (discussing transitory
allocations) and supra notes 138-41 (discussing shifting character allocations). The
general rules testing allocations for substantiality can apply and force a reallocation
of the distributive shares even if the transitory and character shifting rules do not
apply. See supra notes 128-29.
222. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(bX2Xiii). See supra notes 138-41 (discussing shifting
character allocations). The general rules testing allocations for substantiality can
apply and force a reallocation of the distributive shares even if the character shift-
ing rules do not apply. See supra notes 128-29.
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liability protection that surrounds the partner or member mak-
ing the loan or guaranteeing the entity's third party nonrecourse
debt, determine who receives the allocations of losses and mini-
mum gain under the partner nonrecourse debt rules.
If the unincorporated entity incurs liabilities meeting the
definition of recourse under § 1.1001-2 (the entity as the borrow-
er is personally liable), then the type of business organization
chosen greatly affects how the § 704(b) regulations apply to the
distributive shares. The presence or absence of limited liability
protection serves as the pivotal characteristic that determines
whether the substantial economic effect or the nonrecourse allo-
cation regime applies. Under state law, all partners in general
partnerships are personally liable for all debts for which the
partnership bears personal liability.' In other words, the re-
course nature of the liability to the partnership automatically
passes through to the partners and renders them automatically
personally liable for all recourse debts of the partnership by
virtue of their status as general partners. These recourse obliga-
tions include not only traditional loans the partnership incurs
from banks or other creditors, but also judgment claims of tort
claimants.2  Consequently, state law creates an automatic def-
icit restoration obligation for all general partners, with no set
dollar amount.' The partners determine their ultimate contri-
bution rights against each other based on the ratio in which
they have agreed to bear losses.' If a partner guarantees the
partnership's recourse liability, the standard subrogation rights,
which allow the guarantor to proceed against the other partners
based on the loss sharing ratio, prevent the guarantee from
223. ALA. CODE § 10-8A-306(a) (1999); see also id. § 10-9B-403(a) ("Except as pro-
vided in this chapter or in the partnership agreement, a general partner of a limited
partnership has the rights and powers and is subject to the restrictions of a partner
in a partnership without limited partners.").
224. Id. § 10-8A-306(a) ('[A]I partners are liable jointly and severally for all obli-
gations of the partnership unless otherwise agreed by the claimant or provided by
law.").
225. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(bX2XiiXc) (as amended in 1997).
226. If the partners fail to agree to a ratio for bearing losses incurred by the
partnership, the statutory default divides partnership losses in proportion to the
partners' shares of profits. ALA. CODE § 10-8A-401(b) ("Each partner is entitled to an
equal share of the partnership profits and, subject to the limitations in subsection
(aX2) of this section, is chargeable with a share of the partnership losses in propor-
tion to the partner's share of the profits.").
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shifting the economic burden to the guarantor, under both the
economic effect safe harbor and the § 752 regulations.227
Under state law, only general partners of limited partner-
ships bear personal liability for all the partnership's recourse
debts. Consequently, state law creates an automatic deficit res-
toration obligation with no set dollar amount only for the gener-
al partners of limited partnerships. Because limited partners
enjoy the same limited liability protection as shareholders of
corporations, limited partners have no automatic deficit restora-
tion obligation imposed upon them as a matter of state law for
the limited partnership's recourse liabilities.' Unless a limit-
ed partner contractually agrees to an obligation to restore a
deficit capital account, or to another form of a payment obliga-
tion shifting the economic risk of loss for the recourse liability
away from the general partner, only the general partner can
receive distributive shares of losses attributable to the limited
partnership's recourse liabilities. However, as long as the part-
ners comply with the alternate test for economic effect, limited
partners can receive distributive shares of losses attributable to
the limited partnership's recourse liabilities without agreeing to
an unlimited deficit restoration obligation.' If a limited part-
227. See id. § 10-8A-401; Treas. Reg. §§ 1.704-1(bX2XiiXc) (as amended in 1997)
& 1.752-2 (1991).
228. ALA. CODE §§ 10-8A-306, 10-9B-403 ("Except as provided in this chapter or
in the partnership agreement, a general partner of a limited partnership has the
rights and powers and is subject to the restrictions of a partner in a partnership
without limited partners."). Id. § 10-9B-303(a).
Except as provided in subsection (d), a limited partner is not liable for the ob-
ligations of a limited partnership unless he or she is also a general partner
or, in addition to the exercise of his or her rights and powers as a limited
partner, he or she participates in the control of the business. However, if the
limited partner participates in the control of the business, he or she is liable
only to persons who transact business with the limited partnership reasonably
believing, based upon the limited partner's participation in such control, that
the limited partner is a general partner.
Id.
229. Normally, a limited partner will only agree to a deficit restoration obligation
capped at a specific dollar amount-a limited deficit restoration obligation. A limited
partner should never agree to an unlimited deficit restoration obligation. Such an
agreement would remove the limited liability shield afforded a limited partner and
create the same personal liability exposure of a general partner. Any time a limited
partner receives a distributive share of losses, the partnership must comply with the
alternate test even if the distributive share does not cause or create a deficit capital
account (as would be the case if the limited partner's capital account equals at least
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ner guarantees the partnership's recourse liability, the standard
subrogation rights, which allow the guarantor to proceed against
the general partner based on the general partner's personal
liability under state law, prevent the guarantee from shifting
the economic burden to the guarantor, under both the economic
effect test and the § 752 regulations. °
B. Allocation Rules in the Context of LLCs and LLPs
Incurring Recourse Liabilities
The limited liability protection accorded all members of
LLCs and all partners of LLPs greatly affects how the partner-
ship allocation rules apply when the LLC or the LLP incurs lia-
bilities meeting the definition of recourse under § 1.1001-2. De-
spite the LLC's or LLP's personal liability as the borrower, by
virtue of the limited liability protection provided by state law, no
member or partner has personal liability exposure. Because no
member or partner can be forced to make payments or contribu-
tions, absent an explicit contractual agreement, the § 752 regu-
lations treat liabilities that are recourse to the LLC or LLP as
nonrecourse for tax purposes."' Therefore, the rules governing
allocations attributable to nonrecourse liabilities apply.232
Practical difficulties can arise in the minimum gain calculations
with respect to liabilities which are recourse to the LLC or LLP.
When a LLC or LLP borrows on a recourse basis, under state
law the creditor has the right to proceed against every asset the
entity owns.' Because minimum gain calculations focus on
the spread between the basis of assets available to satisfy the
debt and the face of the debt, minimum gain with respect to
zero or a positive number). Although the limited partner does not have to agree to a
deficit restoration obligation in order to receive the loss (unless the expected debits
to the capital account under § 1.704-1(bX2XiiXdX4)-(6) along with the distributive
share of losses create a deficit capital account), the qualified income offset require-
ment of the alternate test ensures that no unexpected debits to the capital account
(as contemplated by § 1.704-1(bX2XiiXdX4)-(6)) create a deficit capital account in the
future that is not covered by a deficit restoration obligation. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-
l(bX2XiiXd).
230. See supra notes 223-25 and 228.
231. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2 (1991).
232. Id. § 1.704-2(bX3).
233. See ALA. CODE § 10-8A-307(d) (1999).
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recourse debts of a LLC or LLP will literally fluctuate with the
available cash flow that remains undistributed at the end of the
taxable year. If the bases of all available assets exceed the face
amount of the recourse liabilities (which can occur if the entity
retains a significant amount of its cash flow), minimum gain will
not increase, thus preventing the nonrecourse allocation rules
from applying.
If a member of a LLC or partner of a LLP guarantees a
liability that is recourse to the entity, the guarantee will shift
the entire economic risk of loss to the guarantor. Although the
LLC or LLP bears personal liability for payment on the debt, the
limited liability shield enjoyed by all members or partners pre-
vents that personal liability from passing through; therefore no
subrogation rights against other members or partners exist for
the guarantor to inherit. However, since the liability is recourse
to the LLC or LLP under § 1.1001-2, the partner nonrecourse
debt rules do not apply. Because the creditor has rights to pro-
ceed against all the assets of the entity, the mechanics of the
partner nonrecourse debt rules are not needed to properly mea-
sure the amount of real loss potential that exists for allocation
purposes with respect to the recourse liability. Under the sub-
stantial economic effect rules, the obligation to make payments
pursuant to the guarantee will be treated as a limited obligation
to restore a deficit capital account capable of supporting distrib-
utive shares of losses under the economic effect safe harbor.
Income allocations that restore previous loss allocations must
clear the substantiality rules, with the transitory allocation
rules posing the most obvious hurdle. If members of LLCs or
partners of LLPs make recourse loans to the entity, the alloca-
tions must be analyzed similarly under the substantial economic
effect safe harbor, with the loan essentially being treated as a
deemed obligation to restore a deficit capital account.'
At least at a practical level, from the perspective of the
members of LLCs and the partners of LLPs, recourse versus
nonrecourse liabilities to the entity are very similar on a sub-
234. Because only equity contributions can increase a partner's capital account,
the recourse loan made to the LLC or LLP must be analyzed as an obligation to
restore a deficit capital account. If at a later time the LLC or LLP fails to pay the
liability, the unpaid loan proceeds must be treated as an actual contribution made
pursuant to the earlier obligation to restore a deficit capital account.
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stantive level. With both types of liabilities, state law protects
the members or partners from personal liability exposure. Both
types of liabilities also require a member or partner either to
provide the funds as the lender or to contractually agree to a
payment or deficit restoration obligation in order to bear the eco-
nomic risk of loss if the entity defaults on the loan.' Despite
this strong substantive resemblance, if a member or partner
makes the loan or contractually agrees to a payment or deficit
restoration obligation, the partner nonrecourse debt rules apply
to the distributive shares when the liability is nonrecourse to
the LLC or LLP, while the substantial economic effect rules ap-
ply to the distributive shares when the liability is recourse to
the LLC or LLP.
At the broadest level, the partner nonrecourse debt and the
substantial economic effect rules often produce the same re-
sults-the member or partner who bears the economic risk of
loss for the liability receives the corresponding losses and in-
come allocations restoring those losses. Despite their similari-
ties, material differences within the details of the substantial
economic effect and the partner nonrecourse debt allocation
regimes, especially when focusing on income allocations, can
affect the partners or members. The partner nonrecourse debt
rules require minimum gain chargeback allocations at the appro-
priate time determined by the timing of minimum gain decreas-
es. On the other hand, the substantial economic effect rules
permit income allocations restoring previous loss allocations, but
only if the partners clear the substantiality rules, with the tran-
sitory rules being the most obvious hurdle.' Arguably, it is
235. Of course from the entity's perspective, material differences exist between
recourse and nonrecourse loans. Recourse lenders have the power to seize all of the
entity's assets while nonrecourse lenders may only proceed against the assets identi-
fied as securing the loan in the loan agreement. These materially different conse-
quences to the entity arguably spill over indirectly to the owners in that the entity's
recourse loans made or guranteed by the member or partner offer more protection
(all assets secure the loan) than similar nonrecourse loans (only limited assets se-
cure the loan). Arguably, these differences do not justify the major tax distinctions
between the partner nonrecourse debt and the substantial economic effect rules.
236. The mechanical rules for allocating losses under the partner nonrecourse
debt and substantial economic effect rules contain major differences that often in-
crease the complexity and confusion in an already difficult area. The partner nonre-
course debt rules segregate the different partner nonrecourse liabilities, conduct
minimum gain calculations and label and allocate existing losses to the appropriate
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inequitable and inefficient to apply two separate sets of rules,
the partner nonrecourse debt and the substantial economic effect
rules, based on the status of the debt as nonrecourse versus
recourse to the LLC or LLP.
Unfortunately, the tax inefficiency resulting from different
rules applying to substantively similar situations is not the only
consequence of the substantial economic effect rules operating
when LLC members or LLP partners bear the economic risk of
loss for the entity's recourse debt. Because the partner nonre-
course debt rules cannot apply when a member or partner
makes a recourse loan to a LLC or LLP and when a member or
partner guarantees a recourse loan made to a LLC or LLP, the
potential exists that illusory deficit restoration obligations can
support distributive shares of losses from a LLC or LLP. If part-
ners or members other than the lender or guarantor agree to
deficit restoration obligations that are in fact illusory, because
the lender or guarantor enjoys no capital account credit for his
outlay of funds, arguably the current definition of obligation to
restore a deficit capital account in the economic safe harbor
treats the illusory obligation as a real obligation."' Because
the LLC or LLP as the borrower bears personal liability, the
partner nonrecourse debt rules do not apply and therefore can-
not operate to ensure that the appropriate partner or member
partner. The economic effect rules focus on the proper debiting of the capital account
with a sufficient obligation to restore a deficit capital account if loss distributive
shares create a deficit. Although substantively each regime focuses on the losses
going to the appropriate partner, the partner nonrecourse debt rules require more
complex calculations and impose more record keeping burdens.
237. See supra notes 203-09 and accompanying text (explanation of illusory deficit
restoration obligations). The constructive liquidation process of the § 752 regulations
triggers gain equal to the difference between the face of liabilities where payment is
limited to one or more assets of the partnership and the basis of the assets avail-
able to satisfy the liabiliiesy. With LLCs and LLPs payment is always initially limit-
ed to one or more assets of the partnership (in this case all the assets of the part-
nership) even though under state law the liability is recourse to the LLC or LLP. If
a member or partner makes a recourse loan to the LLC or LLP or guarantees the
LLC's or LLP's recourse loan under circumstances where payment on the guarantee
results in no capital account credit, payment is still limited to the assets of the LLC
or LLP. Therefore a deficit restoration obligation agreed to by another member or
partner is illusory because the gain triggered in the constructive liquidation process
will eliminate the deficit restoration obligation thus ensuring that the member or
partner will never be required to restore the deficit capital account. See also Hamill,
Final Regulations, supra note 15, at 120-21.
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receives the distributive shares of losses. If these illusory deficit
restoration obligations can support distributive shares of losses
under the economic effect safe harbor, LLCs and LLPs incurring
recourse debt expose a major hole in the partner nonrecourse
debt rules.'
The Service should amend the current regulations to ad-
dress the tax inefficiency of two different sets of allocation rules
applying to substantively similar situations and the more seri-
ous problem of illusory deficit restoration obligations potentially
supporting distributive shares of losses when LLCs and LLPs
incur recourse debt. To accomplish these twin goals, the defini-
tion of partner nonrecourse debt in § 1.704-2(b)(4) could be modi-
fied to include recourse liabilities incurred by LLCs, LLPs and
any other unincorporated business organizations offering com-
plete limited liability protection to all owners. The modified
definition could change the initial trigger defining partner non-
recourse debt from the liability's status to the borrower under
§ 1.1001-2 to the liability's status with respect to the partners
under state law. That would enlarge the definition of partner
nonrecourse debt to potentially include liabilities where no part-
ner initially bore the risk of loss due to the state law limited





238. The anti-abuse rule represents a separate line of attack for the Service. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2 (1991). Also § 704(d) will operate to suspend the loss if the
member or partner agreeing to the illusory deficit restoration obligation needs a
share of the LLC's or LLP's recourse debt in outside basis. See supra note 208.
239. The definition of partner nonrecourse debt in § 1.704-2(bX4) could be modi-
fied to read: "Partner nonrecourse debt means any debt incurred by a partnership
for which no partner bears the economic risk of loss under state law as a result of
being a partner, but for which one or more partners does bear the economic risk of
loss under § 1.752-2(b) via a contractual agreement or by being the source of the
funds (i.e., is the creditor)." By focusing on the consequences to the partner under
state law rather than to the entity, this definition initially renders all liabilities
where state law protects the partners from personal liability (either because the lia-
bility is truly nonrecourse to the borrower or limited liability protects all partners)
as eligible to be covered by the partner nonrecourse debt rules. This definition also
carefully avoids including liabilities where state law automatically imposes personal
liability on at least one partner (recourse liabilities incurred by general and limited
partnerships) where the potential of illusory deficit restoration obligations does not
exist. The reference to § 752's constructive liquidation process ensures that in fact a
partner bears the economic risk of loss and appropriately identifies which partner re-
ceives the partner nonrecourse deductions.
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Although enlarging the definition of partner nonrecourse
debt to include all recourse liabilities incurred by unincorporated
business organizations offering limited liability to all partici-
pants would improve the regulations by eliminating the poten-
tial of illusory deficit restoration obligations as well as the dis-
parate treatment between recourse and nonrecourse loans in the
context of LLCs and LLPs, this proposal could be criticized as an
unnecessary extension of the partner nonrecourse debt rules.
First, like all portions of the § 704(b) regulations this proposal
creates more complexity in the name of stopping tax abuse at
the expense of increasing the costs incurred by the average busi-
ness to comply with the § 704(b) regulations. Moreover, the
partner nonrecourse debt rules are not needed to measure how
much real loss potential exists for allocation purposes when the
entity as the borrower bears personal liability.
C. A Broader Solution-Does § 704(b) Need the Partner
Nonrecourse Debt Rules?
As previously stated, the § 704(b) regulations created the
partner nonrecourse debt allocation rules for two identifiable
reasons. First, the partner nonrecourse debt rules ensure that
the partnership allocates the proper amount of losses, through
the measurement of real loss potential at the partnership level
The following example illustrates how this definition works. Assume that X
and Y form a LLP which purchases a single machine lathe using the proceeds from
a $90,000 loan, which is recourse to the LLP, made by a third party lender. X guar-
antees the entire loan and Y agrees to a $45,000 limited deficit restoration obliga-
tion. The third party lender has a right to proceed directly against X in the event
the LLP fails to pay back the loan, but X has no right to a capital account credit
for any payments made pursuant to the guarantee. Under the proposed definition of
partner nonrecourse debt the recourse loan made to the LLP meets the definition of
partner nonrecourse debt with X bearing the entire economic risk of loss. The con-
structive liquidation process of the § 752 regulations disregards Y's deficit restoration
obligation as illusory because X has no right to enforce that obligation due to the
absence of a capital account credit for payment on the guarantee. Under the current
definition of partner nonrecourse debt, the $90,000 recourse loan to the LLP is not
covered by the definition. The substantial economic effect rules govern the distribu-
tive shares of losses and arguably Y's $45,000 illusory deficit restoration obligation
can be used to support a distributive share of losses even though the constructive
liquidation process of the § 752 regulations allocates the entire outside basis increase
for the $90,000 liability to X Professor Hamill credits Robert Plott and Thad Davis
for providing the statutory language and the example in well written exam answers.
666 [Vol. 51:2:603
2000] Section 704(b)'s Application to LLCs and LLPs
using the minimum gain calculations. Second, by using § 752's
constructive liquidation process to define the appropriate part-
ner to receive the losses, the partner nonrecourse debt rules
prevent illusory deficit restoration obligations from supporting
distributive shares of losses. Of these two goals, the potential of
tax abusive allocation schemes through the use of illusory deficit
restoration obligations probably poses more danger to the integ-
rity of the tax system than imprecise measurements of losses at
the partnership level. Two separate sets of regulatory require-
ments, the substantial economic effect and the partner nonre-
course debt rules, cover what amounts to, in the broadest sense,
distributive shares of losses where partners bear an economic
burden and the distributive shares of income restoring those
losses. This duplicate coverage adds an enormous amount of
complexity to an area that already enjoys the reputation as one
of the most difficult in the income tax arena-partnership taxa-
tion generally and the § 704(b) allocation rules specifically.
Furthermore, the mechanical details of the partner nonre-
course debt rules do not always produce results consistent with
their most important goals. The partner nonrecourse debt rules
apply even when illusory deficit restoration obligations pose no
threat and result in different rules applying to recourse and
nonrecourse liabilities when members of LLCs or partners of
LLPs contractually agree to bear the economic risk of loss for
the entity's liability. Even more problematically, the partner
nonrecourse debt rules leave open opportunity for LLC members
and LLP partners to rely on illusory deficit restoration obliga-
tions in order to support distributive shares of losses when LLCs
and LLPs incur recourse debt.
At the broadest level, the problems with the partner nonre-
course debt rules stem from the substantive difference between
the two "triggers" of § 704(b) which are: (1) the state law defini-
tions of recourse and nonrecourse in § 1.1001-2 and (2) the eco-
nomic risk of loss analysis in § 752. Section 752 relies on the
existence of a real economic burden, in substance, to the individ-
ual partners. Section 1.1001-2, however, bases its distinctions on
the superficial form of the debt to borrower-entity, rather than
the real substantive consequences of that debt to the members
or partners. These substance and form differences clash when
they are combined in the partner nonrecourse debt rules, which
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effectively act as a hybrid between the substantial economic
effect rules and the rules governing allocations attributable to
nonrecourse liabilities. These differences stand out in the con-
text of LLCs and LLPs, where globally little substantive differ-
ence exists at the member or partner level between state law de-
fined recourse and nonrecourse debt. Because the bulk of the
regulations under both §§ 752 and 704(b) were written before
LLCs and LLPs gained national prominence, it is not surprising
that the regulations fail to recognize the unique issues raised by
these entities.'
If it were possible to eliminate the partner nonrecourse debt
rules and cover all allocations related to liabilities where a part-
ner bears the economic burden under the substantial economic
effect rules, the § 704(b) regulations would become considerably
more user friendly. This would simplify the § 704(b) regulations
in a manner that follows § 752's regulatory example, which
divides all partnership liabilities into two regimes-those lia-
bilities where one or more partners bears the economic risk of
loss and those liabilities where no partner bears the economic
risk of loss. The best way to accomplish this goal would be to
accompany a repeal of the partner nonrecourse debt rules with a
change in the language of the substantial economic effect re-
gime. The new language would require all legitimate deficit res-
toration obligations for economic effect purposes to be tied to the
partner bearing the economic risk of loss under the § 752 regula-
tions. In addition to vastly simplifying the § 704(b) regulations,
this change would end the use of the partner nonrecourse debt
rules when the threat of illusory deficit restoration obligations is
not present. The modification would also eliminate the discrep-
ancies caused by disparate treatment between the substantial
economic effect and the partner nonrecourse debt rules when
LLCs and LLPs incur recourse verus nonrecourse debt. More
importantly, this change would prevent tax planners from ex-
ploiting the opportunity that arguably allows illusory deficit
restoration obligations to support distributive shares of losses
240. See supra notes 50-64 (discussing the historical trail of the § 704(b) regula-
tions after the substantial economic effect standard was codified in 1976) and notes
69-77 (explaining the historical trail of the § 752 regulations). Professor Hamill cred-
its Lisa Moss for articulating the analysis in this paragraph, much of which was
taken word-for-word from her well written exam answer.
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when LLCs and LLPs incur recourse debt."'
However, in order for these amendments to completely re-
place the partner nonrecourse debt rules, language would need
to be added to the economic effect safe harbor to preserve the
measurement scheme that now exists through the minimum
gain calculations in the partner nonrecourse debt rules. Because
the economic effect safe harbor measures the loss potential by
referring to the partners' capital accounts with respect to all
partnership assets in the aggregate, any elimination of the part-
ner nonrecourse debt rules must be accompanied with a mecha-
nism to measure how much real loss potential exists when part-
ners face an economic burden for partnership liabilities where
the assets in the aggregate cannot measure the risk. In other
words, the substantial economic effect rules can be enlarged to
include distributive shares of losses and income currently han-
dled by the partner nonrecourse debt rules only if the amend-
ment includes a "measurement mechanism" to determine how
much real loss potential exists for liabilities that are nonre-
course to the entity.
241. These changes could be made by (1) amending § 1.704-1(bX2XiiXbX3) to re-
place "unconditionally obligated to restore the amount of such deficit to the partner-
ship" with "unconditionally obligated to make payments or contributions to the part-
nership liabilities, such obligation bearing the economic risk of loss for that liability,
whereby such obligation would reduce a deficit balance if the partnership construc-
tively liquidated, as set out under § 1.752-2"; (2) amending § 1.704-1(bX2XiiXc) by
adding- "For the purposes of partnership allocations under § 1.704, an obligation to
restore a deficit balance must bear the economic risk of loss for that liability if the
partnership constructively liquidated, as set out under § 1.752-2, in determining
whether such obligation has economic effect"; and (3) amending § 1.704-
l(bX2XiiXdX2) by replacing "is not obligated to restore the deficit balance in his
capital account to the partnership or is obligated to restore only a limited dollar
amount of such deficit balance" with
is not obligated to make payments or contributions to the partnership liabili-
ties, such obligation bearing the economic risk of loss for that liability, where-
by such obligation would reduce a deficit balance if the partnership construc-
tively liquidated, as set out under § 1.752-2, or is obligated to pay or contrib-
ute only a limited dollar amount of such partnership liabilities, whereby such
limited obligation would reduce a deficit balance in proportion to the limited
dollar amount if the partnership constructively liquidated, as set out under
§ 1.752-2.




The aggregate theory of taxing partnerships as flow-through
entities, which dates back to the first modern income tax, creat-
ed the need to account for the partnership's items of income,
gain, loss, deduction and credit in the partners' distributive
shares. The vast flexibility enjoyed by partners under state law
to craft any economic arrangement for sharing profits and losses
that they see fit explains why the partners have unlimited flexi-
bility to share the partnship's items of income and loss for tax
purposes in any ratio they choose. The ability of tax planners to
use this flexibility to allocate the partnership's tax distributive
shares in ways that further no legitimate business purpose other
than to save taxes created the need to invent § 704(b) and its
regulations. The § 704(b) regulations contain three different sets
of allocation regimes that apply to distribute shares of taxable
losses and income. The substantial economic effect safe harbor
governs all allocations that carry the possibility of actual eco-
nomic losses or income and essentially requires the tax distribu-
tive shares to mirror the partners' business deal. The nonre-
course debt allocation rules recognize that losses and deductions
attributable to proceeds from nonrecourse liabilities cannot carry
economic burdens or benefits. The separate regime for alloca-
tions attributable to nonrecourse liabilities provides a mechani-
cal set of rules that measure the existence and timing of losses
and income that carry no economic benefits or burdens and then
sets up a safe harbor for allocating their distributive shares.
Partners enjoy a great deal of flexibility to allocate losses attrib-
utable to nonrecourse debt under ratios designed loosely to mir-
ror allocations of losses and income that do carry economic con-
sequences. The minimum gain chargeback requirement ensures
that the appropriate partners who received nonrecourse deduc-
tions restore those deductions with phantom gain.
The partner nonrecourse debt allocation rules set up a third
parallel regime to operate alongside the nonrecourse debt alloca-
tion rules to cover losses and income attributable to nonrecourse
liabilities at the partnership level where a partner nevertheless
bears the economic risk of loss due to external contractual cir-
cumstances. The partner nonrecourse debt rules are needed to
ensure that the proper partner receives the appropriate amount
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of losses. The current economic effect language does not guaran-
tee that the appropriate partner will receive the distributable
share of losses because the safe harbor arguably treats all ob-
ligations to restore as valid to support a deficit capital account,
even if the obligation is illusory due to the presence of minimun
gain. The current economic effect language contains no mecha-
nisms to measure the proper amount of losses at the partnership
level when the creditor cannot proceed against all the assets of
the partnership. The partner nonrecourse debt rules, by rigidly
requiring separate minimum gain calculations for each partner-
ship nonrecourse liability and using the § 752 constructive liqui-
dation process to identify which partner bears the economic risk
of loss, properly measure the losses at the partnership level and
ensure that the proper partner receives the tax losses, known as
partner nonrecourse debt deductions.
In addition to adding enormous complexity to the § 704(b)
regulations, the partner nonrecourse debt rules do not work
perfectly. Many liabilities (for example, guarantees of partner-
ship nonrecourse liabilities that carry rights to a capital account
credit) are covered by the partner nonrecourse debt rules even
though no potential exists for another partner to receive losses
through an illusory obligation to restore a deficit capital account.
Even more disturbing, the definition of partner nonrecourse debt
fails to cover liabilities that are recourse to a LLC or LLP, even
though the potential for loss allocations supported by illusory
deficit restoration obligations exists under the economic effect
safe harbor. If a member or partner guarantees a LLC's or LLP's
recourse liability under circumstances where no capital account
rights exist (or if a member or partner makes a recourse loan to
the LLC or LLP), the economic effect safe harbor can literally be
invoked to legitimize a deficit restoration obligation of a non-
guarantor (or a non-lender), despite the absence of any means to
enforce the obligation. If the partner nonrecourse debt rules
were amended to cover all liabilities where state law protects
the members or partners from bearing personal liability, the
non-guarantor (or non-lender) would not only be denied an out-
side basis increase, but would also not be able to receive losses
under the partner nonrecourse debt rules.
To simplify the three regimes that currently govern alloca-
tions, while making sure that distributive shares of losses al-
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ways carry a potential economic burden if one exists, the Trea-
sury could attempt to eliminate the partner nonrecourse debt
rules by revising the definition of obligation to restore under the
economic effect safe harbor to provide a direct coordination with
the constructive liquidation process of § 752. Linking § 704(b)'s
definition of a valid deficit restoration obligation with § 752's
constructive liquidation test for economic risk of loss would en-
sure that only legitimate payment obligations are respected
under the economic effect safe harbor and would further ensure
that only partners with legitimate payment obligations receive
loss allocations. Because illusory deficit restoration obligations
would no longer be recognized as valid obligations to restore,
there would be no need for the partner nonrecourse debt rules to
cover the many situations where illusory deficit restoration obli-
gations can inappropriately shift losses. More importantly, an
amendment that directly links the § 752 constructive liquidation
process to the definition of obligation to restore under the eco-
nomic effect safe harbor would render ineffective illusory deficit
restoration obligations that now can inappropriately shift losses
when LLCs or LLPs incur recourse obligations.
Although revising the definition of obligation to restore to
directly refer to § 752's definition of risk of loss could easily be
accomplished, the partner nonrecourse debt rules still cannot be
eliminated without dealing with the measurement of loss prob-
lem. The economic effect safe harbor currently measures the
partnership's loss potential by referring to the partners' capital
accounts with respect to all the partnership's assets in the
aggregate. As long as the partnership's cash and assets consist
of equity, and debt for which the partnership bears personal
liability, a measurement scheme that aggregates all assets as
having the same potential to produce partnership losses properly
measures the losses. Losses from liabilities where the partner-
ship bears no personal liability cannot properly be measured at
the partnership level without a measurement scheme that exam-
ines the individual liability and the basis of any assets serving
as collateral. The partner nonrecourse debt rules properly mea-
sure the partnership's losses before allocating them to the appro-
priate partner. Any elimination of the partner nonrecourse debt
rule must be accompanied by revisions to the economic effect
safe harbor that incorporates this measurement scheme.
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